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lethality documents the interconnections and relationship of information flow and the 
system requirements for maintaining the interconnection links during a simulated 
operational deployment of an adaptive force package (AFP). This modeling structure 
provides for an architecture view of the functions and measures of effectiveness that 
provide criteria for decision making during the operational planning of a distributed 
lethality mission. Development of an initial architecture enables future modeling and 
architecture refinement through simulations of the C2 structure and further research into 
technologies and methods of effective communication systems. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii




C.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................2 
D.  SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................2 
E.  STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS .................................................................3 
1.  Stakeholder Identification .............................................................3 
2.  Stakeholder Needs ..........................................................................3 
II.  CONCEPT DEFINITION .....................................................................................5 
A.  COMMAND AND CONTROL ................................................................5 
1.  The Levels of War ..........................................................................5 
2.  Organizing Ships: Tactical Command .........................................7 
3.  The Third “C” of C2: Communications ......................................8 
B.  DISTRIBUTED LETHALITY .................................................................9 
C.  CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ..............................................................12 
D.  SCENARIOS ............................................................................................14 
1.  Notional Scenario Development ..................................................15 
2.  Scenario Model Simulation Development ..................................20 
3.  Scenario C2 Networking Options ...............................................29 
III.  FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE ...................................................................31 
A.  FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS ..................................31 
B.  REQUIREMENTS ARCHITECTURE .................................................33 
1.  Command and Control Requirements .......................................34 
2.  Communications Requirements .................................................36 
3.  Adaptive Force Package Mission Areas .....................................37 
4.  Flexible Force Structure ..............................................................38 
C.  FUNCTIONAL FLOWS .........................................................................39 
D.  FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION .....................................................41 
IV.  PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE .........................................................................45 
A.  DISTRIBUTED LETHALITY PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE ........45 
B.  PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS ................................45 
1.  Headquarters ................................................................................46 
2.  Networks .......................................................................................47 
3.  Operation Order ..........................................................................51 
 viii
4.  AFP Units ......................................................................................53 
V.  SYSTEM ANALYSIS ..........................................................................................55 
A.  SIMULATION DESCRIPTION.............................................................55 




B.  TEST CASES ...........................................................................................59 
1.  Test Case 1: Network Architecture ............................................60 
2.  Test Case 2: AFP Commander ...................................................61 
3.  Test Case 3: Simulated Contested Spectrum Environment .....62 
4.  Test Case 4: Command Decisions ...............................................64 
C.  DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS ...............................................................66 
1.  C2 Message Delivery Success ......................................................67 
2.  Non-C2 Message Delivery Success .............................................68 
3.  C2 Message Delivery Time ..........................................................68 
4.  Non-C2 Message Delivery Time .................................................69 
5.  Time from Request to Engagement ............................................70 
D.  MODEL VERIFICATION .....................................................................70 
VI.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................73 
A.  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ...................................................................73 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................75 
C.  ADDITIONAL RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS ......................75 
APPENDIX A. SIMULATION RESULTS....................................................................77 
APPENDIX B. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS ....................................................................85 
A.  DERIVED MODEL REQUIREMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS .......85 
1.  Model Assumptions ......................................................................85 
2.  OA4606: Wargaming Applications Source Information .........85 
3.  OA4606: Wargaming Scenario 2 AFP .......................................86 
4.  Platform Line of Sight Calculations ...........................................87 
5.  Platform Model Parameters of Interest .....................................87 
6.  Values for Platform Model Parameters .....................................88 
7.  Other Platform Model Considerations ......................................89 
APPENDIX C. STATISTICAL TESTING ...................................................................91 
 ix
APPENDIX D. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS ...........................................................101 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..............................................................................................103 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF FIGURES 
  Combatant Command. Source: Department of the Navy (2010a). ..............6 Figure 1.
  Levels of Tactical Command. Source: Department of the Navy Figure 2.
(2010a). ........................................................................................................8 
  OV-1 AFP Concept of Operations. ............................................................12 Figure 3.
  OV-1 AFP Scenario. Adapted from Orndorff et al. (2015). ......................13 Figure 4.
  Notional Base Scenario — South China Sea. Adapted from Orndorff Figure 5.
et al. (2015). ...............................................................................................16 
  Centralized, Decentralized, and Distributed Networks. Source: Baran Figure 6.
(1964). ........................................................................................................17 
  Centralized Network Scenario. Adapted from Orndorff et al. (2015); Figure 7.
Baran (1964). .............................................................................................18 
  Decentralized Network Scenario. Adapted from Orndorff et al. Figure 8.
(2015) and Baran (1964). ...........................................................................18 
  Distributed Network Scenario. Adapted from Orndorff et al. (2015); Figure 9.
Baran (1964). .............................................................................................19 
  AFP 1 Scenario OASuW Range. ...............................................................22 Figure 10.
  AFP 1 Scenario Platform Separation. ........................................................23 Figure 11.
  AFP 1 Scenario Platform with Airborne Relay. ........................................24 Figure 12.
  AFP 1 Scenario 2025 Notional OASuW Ranges. ......................................25 Figure 13.
  AFP 1 Scenario 2025 Notional Communication Ranges. ..........................26 Figure 14.
  AFP 1 Scenario Worst-Case Communication Ranges. ..............................27 Figure 15.
  AFP 1 Scenario LCS Alternate Layout. .....................................................28 Figure 16.
  The Systems Engineering Process. Source: Systems Management Figure 17.
College, Department of Defense (2001). ...................................................32 
  SOS Engineering Process. Source: Systems Management College, Figure 18.
Department of Defense (2001). ..................................................................33 
 xii
  Top Level Requirements Diagram. ............................................................34 Figure 19.
  Command and Control Requirements. .......................................................35 Figure 20.
  OPORD Considerations. ............................................................................36 Figure 21.
  Communications Requirements. ................................................................37 Figure 22.
  Adaptive Force Package Mission Areas. ...................................................37 Figure 23.
  Flexible Force Structure Requirements. ....................................................38 Figure 24.
  OASuW Engagement Functional Flow — Traditional C2. .......................40 Figure 25.
  OASuW Engagement Functional Flow — Distributed Lethality C2. .......41 Figure 26.
  Organic OTHT Surface-to-Surface Functional Decomposition. Figure 27.
Source: Johnson et al. (2015). ....................................................................42 
  Revised Functional Hierarchy....................................................................43 Figure 28.
  Distributed Lethality Physical Architecture. ..............................................45 Figure 29.
  Distributed Lethality Headquarters Physical Architecture. .......................46 Figure 30.
  Distributed Lethality Network Physical Architecture. ...............................47 Figure 31.
  Centralized C2 Network Architecture. ......................................................48 Figure 32.
  Decentralized C2 Network Architecture. ...................................................49 Figure 33.
  Distributed C2 Network Architecture. .......................................................51 Figure 34.
  OPORD Physical Architecture. .................................................................52 Figure 35.
  AFP Units...................................................................................................53 Figure 36.
  Simulation Block Diagram. .......................................................................55 Figure 37.
  C2 Success in Simulated Contested Spectrum Environment. ....................63 Figure 38.
  C2 Message Command Level Dropout Probability. ..................................65 Figure 39.
  C2 Message Delivery Success Percentage. ................................................67 Figure 40.
  Non-C2 Message Delivery Success Percentage. .......................................68 Figure 41.
  C2 Message Delivery Time. ......................................................................69 Figure 42.
 xiii
  Non-C2 Message Delivery Time. ..............................................................69 Figure 43.
  Time from Request to Engagement. ..........................................................70 Figure 44.
  
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xv
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  AFP in Base Scenario. Source: Orndorff et al. (2015). .............................20 
Table 2.  C2 Message Parameters .............................................................................57 
Table 3.  Non-C2 Message Parameters .....................................................................57 
Table 4.  General Parameters ....................................................................................57 
Table 5.  MOE/MOP .................................................................................................58 
Table 6.  Network Architecture Comparison ............................................................60 
Table 7.  C2 Message Delivery Success P-Value .....................................................61 
Table 8.  Time from Request to Engagement P-Value .............................................61 
Table 9.  AFP Platform as C2 Forwarder ..................................................................62 
Table 10.  C2 Success Rate Paired T-Test ..................................................................63 
Table 11.  Command Authority Levels .......................................................................64 
Table 12.  Command Authority — C2 Message Delivery Success P-Value ..............66 
Table 13.  Command Authority — Time from Request to Engagement P-Value ......66 
Table 14.  Command Authority Dropout Rate Probability .........................................66 
Table 15.  Design of Experiment Factors ...................................................................67 
Table 16.  Model Validation .......................................................................................71 
Table A-1  Test Case 1 Data ........................................................................................77 
Table A-2  Test Case 2 Data ........................................................................................78 
Table A-3  Test Case 3 Data ........................................................................................79 
Table A-4  Test Case 4 Data ........................................................................................80 
Table A-5  Design of Experiment Data ........................................................................81 
Table C-1  Test Case 1 Two Sample T-Test ................................................................92 
Table C-2  Test Case 2 Two Sample T-Test ................................................................94 
 xvi
Table C-3  Test Case 3 Paired T-Test ..........................................................................96 
Table C-4  Test Case 4 Two Sample T-Test — No Jamming .....................................98 
Table C-5  Test Case 4 Paired T-Test — Jamming .....................................................99 
 
 xvii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFP adaptive force package 
BOE back of envelope 
BLOS beyond line of sight 
C2 command and control 
C2P command and control processor 
C3 command, control and communications  
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 
CDR commander 
CCDR combatant commander 
COMNAVSURFOR Commander, Naval Surface Forces 
CONOPS concept of operations 
CSG carrier strike group 
CTF carrier task force 
DAU Defense Acquisition University 
DDG guided missile destroyer 
DODAF Department of Defense Architectural Framework 
DOE design of experiments 
DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, 
and facilities 
EHF extremely high frequency 
EMCON emissions control  
ESSM evolved sea sparrow missile 
ETR external time reference 
FRAGORD fragmentary order 
JREAP  joint range extension application protocol  
GCC geographic combatant command 
HF high frequency 
HHQ higher headquarters 
INCOSE International Council on Systems Engineering 
IP internet protocol 
 xviii
LCS littoral combat ship 
LHA landing helicopter assault 
LHD landing helicopter dock 
LMMT link monitoring and management tool 
LOS line of sight 
MBSE model based systems engineering 
MDR message dropout rate 
MOC maritime operations center 
MOE measures of effectiveness 
MOP measures of performance 
MSP message success percentage 
OASuW offensive anti-surface weapon/weapon 
OPORD operation order 
OTC officer in tactical command 
OV operational viewpoint 
RF radio frequency 
ROE rules of engagement 
SAG Surface Action Group 
SE system engineering  
SEP systems engineering process 
SM standard missile 
SOS system of systems 
TLAM Tomahawk land attack missile 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
USN United States Navy 




In support of a Commander, Naval Surface Forces (COMNAVSURFOR) 
initiative regarding the distributed lethality concept, a Naval Postgraduate School 
Systems of Systems (SOS) systems engineering master’s program capstone team applied 
model based system engineering (MBSE) with computer modeling and simulation to 
examine potential tactical command and control (C2) system architectures of an adaptive 
force package (AFP) operating in a distributed lethality scenario. The architecture is built 
around a South China Sea distributed lethality wargame study conducted by the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Operations Research Department. 
 
Adaptive Force Package Command and Control Network Concept. 
The geographical dispersion of naval forces operating under the distributed 
lethality concept introduces operational challenges to traditional C2 across an AFP due to 
the different characteristics of local and over the horizon communications architectures, 
the long distances required for communications, the anticipated disruption of satellite 
communications, and the relatively close proximity of opposing forces. Tactical C2 
 xx
systems must be flexible to support changing communication architectures. Operational 
C2 must be flexible to work within the boundaries of the available communication 
architectures. 
The use of MBSE and statistical analysis of computer simulation of C2 network 
architectures confirms the hypothesis that a distributed mesh architecture is the most 
robust for distributed lethality C2 networks. Model based systems engineering identifies 
possible efficiencies to the traditional C2 process model that can improve the 
effectiveness of C2 when operating within the constraints of distributed lethality. 
Statistical analysis of computer simulation of C2 networks and process models confirms 
the benefit. A systems architecture refinement to streamline the interactions of the 
operation order (OPORD) is recommended. This study moves the definition of the AFP 
OPORD into the SOS physical architecture for improved communications between the 
AFP and higher headquarters. 
Review of available and near future advanced tactical data links finds no 100% 
solution in a single system. The distributed lethality AFP needs multiple tactical data link 
options to build a distributed mesh network architecture. The need for interoperability 
among all AFP platforms requires common data links. USN, USNS, joint and coalition 
forces will potentially participate in distributed lethality operations as part of an AFP. 
Platforms without common datalinks must be modified to add this capability if 
they are to participate in the AFP C2 network. Advanced tactical data links must be 
interoperable on Link 16 and Link 22 to meet the joint and coalition interoperability 
requirement. AFP C2 systems should include provisions for the joint range extension 
application protocol (JREAP) for use when IP networks or satellite communications are 
available. 
Distributed lethality AFP platforms will benefit from technology updates that 
improve automated network discovery by 
 adding a link monitoring and management tool to identify and correct 
disruptions in tactical data link networks, 
 utilizing an external time reference to aid tactical data link network 
synchronization, and  
 xxi
 employing smart command and control processor data routing to optimize 
routing and eliminate redundant messages. 
Distributed lethality AFP platforms will also improve C2 network operations by 
adding directional antenna systems to the tactical data link systems. Directional antennas 
will shift from omnidirectional radio frequency radiation patterns to a controlled narrow 
beam path directed to other participants of the AFP C2 network. Benefits of directional 
antennas include lower probability of detection of the radiated signal, adding nulling 
patterns to reduce spectrum interference from hostile sources, and lower power output 
requirements for transmitters because a directional antenna focuses the RF signal using 
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The U.S. Navy introduced a new concept to improve combat efficiency via 
localized sea control through an increase in the offensive power of individual components 
of the surface force operating as part of a surface action group (SAG). 
Distributed lethality is the condition gained by increasing the offensive 
power of individual components of the surface force (cruisers, destroyers, 
littoral combat ships [LCSs], amphibious ships, and logistics ships) and 
then employing them in dispersed offensive formations known as “hunter-
killer SAGs. (Rowden, Gumataotao and Fanta 2015) 
Distributed lethality uses a concept called the adaptive force package (AFP) that 
is structured for subordinate commands to join efforts and strengths during coordinated 
maritime operations. Naval command and control (C2) must function within these AFPs 
when operating as part of a distributed lethality SAG. C2 as employed in operations with 
permissive communications environments was not architected to support this type of 
mission; therefore, a need exists to model C2 methods and architectures to better 
understand and ultimately improve the capability of naval forces operating under the 
distributed lethality concept. 
B. PURPOSE 
This research project examines the need to provide C2 to distributed naval forces. 
In order to understand the challenges of providing integrated support to the Navy fleet as 
it exercises this distributed lethality capability, it is essential to develop a framework, or 
systems architecture, that clearly defines and describes C2 challenges regarding 
distributed lethality through the broader application of model based systems  
engineering (MBSE) (Paulo 2016). This systems architecture serves as the centerpiece of 
the development, implementation, and analysis of the overall research effort, which 
includes operational simulation that allows the surface Navy to examine different options 
for providing C2 of naval forces operating in a distributed lethality mode. In support of a 
Commander, Naval Surface Forces (COMNAVSURFOR) initiative regarding the 
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distributed lethality concept, this research seeks to optimize the tactical systems 
architecture for an AFP conducting a complex maritime mission while utilizing the 
distributed lethality concept. This systems architecture considers the integration of 
traditional C2 concepts with command, control, communications, computers, and 
intelligence (C4I) systems. This integrated C2 systems architecture serves to form a basis 
of an operational simulation to analyze possible distributed lethality C2 alternatives, both 
from a technical and doctrinal perspective; assess the different distributed lethality C2 
alternatives regarding their impact on mission success; and model such concepts as the 
“fog of war,” situational awareness, higher headquarters, and human error. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This paper addresses and answers the following questions: 
 What is C2 support for distributed lethality in terms of the systems 
architecture? 
 How can the Navy employ C2 support for distributed lethality? 
 How effective are C2 systems architectures in support of distributed 
lethality? 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This project defines, develops, and assesses C2 support for distributed lethality in 
terms of systems architecture development. By using MBSE as a means to allow an 
operational commander to decide on the most beneficial way in which to successfully 
provide C2 to naval forces operating in a distributed lethality environment, the distributed 
lethality systems architecture includes aspects of doctrine, organization, training, 
materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) (Paulo 2016). This effort is 
constrained to focusing on a specific operational concept, and subsequent mission and 
potential scenarios, which requires the deployment of one or more multi-platform AFP as 
necessary during the overall mission. This effort develops a functional architecture based 
on this operational concept involving a near-peer contested environment, a contested 
radio frequency (RF) spectrum, and additional research that helps shape the development 
of originating requirements regarding distributed lethality. 
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The functions and activities performed by the AFP to achieve mission success in 
the conduct of distributed lethality are defined through the development of a functional 
architecture as part of the overall systems architecture. Using aspects of DOTMLPF, this 
effort evaluates various physical solutions and considers options spanning doctrine, 
tactics, organizational command structure, the requirement for support ships or other 
support platforms, and the combinations of platforms and systems that can make up the 
AFPs. 
E. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
1. Stakeholder Identification 
The maritime domain of warfare requires operational flexibility and adaptive 
platforms. International law governs the majority of the responses that nations (and by 
extension, their maritime services) may take in an armed conflict. The vagaries of 
territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, communications over vast distances, and the 
need for near-real-time coordination means that stakeholders for the distributed lethality 
concept can encompass a wide variety of entities. This distributed lethality C2 research 
project limits the range of possible stakeholders to “major stakeholders”—those 
stakeholders that will further develop or operate with this concept in an allied construct 
and are identified in Appendix D. The list of stakeholders is focused on three levels of 
command: 
 the strategic level commander 
 the tactical level commander 
 the individual ship commander 
 
2. Stakeholder Needs 
The stakeholder needs originate from the need to control and dominate a specific 
area. An essential part of maintaining dominance in the maritime domain is the ability to 
communicate effectively and reliably between all of the forces controlling an area. 
Operational commanders define the methods to exercise C2 of naval forces operating 
across the maritime distributed lethality environment. The C2 need drives the 
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determination of physical solutions across the breadth of available options and may 
include varying doctrine, tactics, structure of organization and command, the requirement 
for support ships or other support platforms, and the combinations of platforms and 
systems that make up the AFPs. The need is total operational environment control, which 
drives the C2 need for determining requirements to meet that need. 
The operational commander needs to communicate their goals and understanding 
of the current environment, their desires for the future environment, and a range of 
permissible actions and outcomes that their tactical commanders can pursue. The tactical 
commander needs to execute their assigned tasks, and provide the operational 
commander with validation of the situation in the operational area, or indications that the 
operational model needs adjustment. 
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II. CONCEPT DEFINITION 
A. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Command and control is defined as “the exercise of authority by a properly 
designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission” (Department of Defense 2016). A nonprofessional’s definition may be how 
military commanders issue directions to their warfighters in order to accomplish a given 
objective. 
Maritime C2 is unique. By its very nature, a Navy ship operates very much alone. 
Before the age of radio communications, a ship’s captain was relied upon to make life 
and death decisions on a regular basis without the aid of higher ranking or more 
experienced officers. It was not until the advent of satellite communications that ship 
commanders could be reached at all times in any location around the world. The U.S. 
Navy relies on a concept known as mission command due to vast distances and variations 
in weather and other communication issues that can prevent a maritime unit from 
contacting higher headquarters. 
Mission command is “the conduct of military operations through decentralized 
execution based upon mission-type orders” (Department of Defense 2016). This approach 
to C2 demands that commanders of fleets give good, precise orders to their ship captains, 
and have enough trust in those captains to carry out their orders. Conversely, ship 
captains must exercise initiative and aggressiveness in the execution of those orders, but 
also must be willing and able to “call home” if unable to accomplish the mission. 
1. The Levels of War 
In the United States military doctrine, there are three levels of war: strategic, 
operational, and tactical. Refer to the illustration in Figure 1 for an overview of 
responsibilities and tasks at each level. 
 6
 
 Combatant Command. Source: Department of the Navy (2010a). Figure 1.
In the strategic level of war, a nation or group of nations determines national or 
multinational objectives, provides guidance and uses national instruments of power to 
achieve these objectives. Top-level national officials—the president, secretary of defense, 
joint chiefs of staff, and combatant commanders—are the primary movers at this level. 
Strategic objectives are not just military in nature, but work in concert with diplomatic, 
intelligence, and political spheres to achieve national level objectives and goals. 
The operational level of war links the strategic objectives laid out by high-level 
national officials to the actions required by tactical level units. The focus at the 
operational level is on military operations at the campaign level. In the maritime domain, 
operational level commanders are typically combatant commanders, their staffs, and their 
components. Combatant commanders are those commanders that are responsible for a 
geographic combatant command (GCC), and all the military operations that take place 
within their GCC. Component commanders are the senior service commanders within 
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each GCC. Each combatant commander has a land, maritime, air, and special operations 
force commander underneath them that deals primarily with the domain specific 
requirements in their GCC. These component commanders are typically the senior 
service representatives for the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, and special operations 
force geographic components. Operational control is the authoritative direction for all 
military operations and joint training. It includes organization and employment of forces, 
and command functions (Department of the Navy 2010a). 
The tactical level of war is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in 
relation to each other (Department of the Navy 2010b). Tactical level commanders 
receive orders regarding an operation from their operational level commanders. These 
orders give the tactical commander the “who, what, where, when, and why” of an 
operation. It is up to the tactical commander to figure out the “how” of executing a given 
mission. There are also multiple tactical level commanders. 
An AFP utilizing the distributed lethality doctrine in the accomplishment of a 
mission would operate at the tactical level of war. The investigation into C2 doctrine is 
therefore confined to this level. A critical component of distributed lethality is delegating 
some operational authorities down to the AFP Commander. 
2. Organizing Ships: Tactical Command 
Individual units are assigned to a task force by the officer in tactical command 
(OTC) of a maritime force, as illustrated in Figure 2. Each task force is then subdivided 
into various task groups, task units, and if required, task elements. Maritime forces are 
divided in this way to give commanders maximum flexibility in tasking via a mission 
type order and to provide a clear chain of command back up to the overall commander. 
 8
 
 Levels of Tactical Command. Source: Department of the Navy Figure 2.
(2010a). 
3. The Third “C” of C2: Communications 
The Navy Warfare Publication 3-56 defines the aim of command as, “to achieve 
the maximum operational and/or administrative effectiveness through direction, 
coordination, and control” (Department of the Navy 2010a). Command is inherently 
difficult in the maritime environment when units assigned to a single task force may be 
spread over hundreds or thousands of miles. To direct, coordinate with, and control units, 
an OTC must have the ability to communicate with units under their command. This 
requirement can be mitigated at the strategic and operational levels of war with proper 
planning and a well-written operations order. The tactical level has a much smaller time 
horizon in which to make decisions. The perils of tactical-level decisions (launching 
aircraft, releasing weapons, or maneuvering to a specific area) are immediate and 
dangerous to the units involved. To enable C2 at the tactical level, a third “C”—for 
communications—is required for effective C2, which results in the command, control, 
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and communications (C3) acronym. The ability for tactical units to communicate, share 
information, and deconflict operations in real time is vital within the maritime domain. 
Execution of current Navy doctrine using a composite warfare commander, who is 
defined as the officer in tactical command of a naval task organization (Department of 
Defense 2016), is dependent upon real-time tactical communication. 
B. DISTRIBUTED LETHALITY 
The legacy concept of a naval commander operating in isolation from higher 
command was superseded by a networked concept of operations, made possible by 
tactical data links and global satellite communications. Reliable communications systems 
enable continuous communications between Navy ships at sea and higher command. The 
communications systems also facilitate data sharing for distribution of a common 
operational picture amongst ships and back to higher command. Forward deployed units 
may receive strategic tasking and enhanced situational awareness because of the ability to 
communicate with experts and senior decision makers located in a networked operations 
center at higher headquarters. 
The essence of sea power is to exert control over the sea lines of communication; 
to do this, a naval force must be able to carry the fight to the enemy (Mahan 1949). 
Proliferation of technologies such as techniques for disruption of satellite 
communications, anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, and over-the-horizon radars have 
enabled near-peer armed forces (particularly China and Russia) to hold the traditional 
purveyor of U.S. Naval power, the carrier strike group (CSG), at risk at ranges beyond 
the CSG’s defensive weapons (Filipoff 2016). Rowden, Gumataotao, and Fanta 
developed the concept of hunter-killer surface action groups as a means to take the fight 
to the foe, which has since been more commonly discussed as distributed lethality. 
This study distills distributed lethality as a doctrine of deploying multiple small 
groups of forces in AFPs across an area of operations to conduct operations against an 
enemy. The AFPs either can be tailored to create a specific set of effects, or can be 
established ad-hoc. The bulk of the units forming an AFP are surface combatants. The 
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AFP concept specifically allows for the incorporation of other platforms, such as aircraft, 
unpiloted vehicles, subsurface assets, supply ships, and other assets of opportunity. 
Several characteristics are key to distributed lethality: 
Offensive in Nature: Distributed lethality is a means to project naval power while 
countering the threats posed by the long-range weapons and sensors of potential 
adversaries. Establishing a time and space for offensive operations against a capable 
adversary necessitates a flexible means of massing firepower to overwhelm defenses in a 
given area. Shifting to a distributed lethality AFP structure creates a more complex 
targeting problem for adversaries while allowing the U.S. Navy more operational 
flexibility. 
Localized Sea Control: In an engagement with a near-peer adversary near their 
shores, a typical scenario assumes that the enemy is proficient at the employment of long-
range sensors and long-range weapons. The adversary also has modern, well-trained, and 
well-equipped forces operating in the maritime region that the U.S. Navy requires access. 
Distributed lethality does not require establishing unchallenged control or access to the 
adversary’s waters before conducting operations or maintaining this control for an 
extended period. Distributed lethality focuses on techniques to allow the AFP to get in, 
accomplish a mission, and get out. 
Deceptive: Distributed lethality allows for greater use of operational deception. 
By creating both false and real targets for a numerically superior adversary to investigate, 
distributed lethality forces the enemy to commit forces to chasing false targets, and 
allows AFP units greater opportunity to find, track, target, and destroy adversary units. 
Dispersed: Distributed lethality seeks to reduce the density of U.S. forces by using 
advances in sensors and communications to cover more ocean area with fewer ships. This 
increases the adversary’s search volume and decreases the opportunity for the adversary 
to engage the AFP into a decisive Mahanian fleet-on-fleet engagement (Mahan 1949). 
Rapid Re-tasking: The OPORD for an AFP is one of the keys to the distributed 
lethality concept. By developing multiple courses of action in advance of an operation 
and by giving the AFP commanders clear tasking with well-defined decision points and 
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break points, the AFP can be rapidly re-tasked. Re-tasking may be initiated by detecting 
changes in the adversary’s posture, by meeting completion conditions for a given section 
of the OPORD, or by a change in AFP capability. 
USMC Integration: “A more fully integrated Marine Corps–surface force combat 
team will provide persistent presence that can influence and control events at sea and in 
the littorals, applying the right capability to the right target for the joint-force 
commander” (Rowden 2016). Distributed lethality employs all available offensive 
weapons systems. USMC integration enables the F-35B joint strike fighter to participate 
as sensor and weapon, and enables participation of ships supporting Marine expeditionary 
forces. 
Limited Carrier Strike Group (CSG) Support: Distributed lethality was developed 
in response to improvements in long-range sensors and engagement capabilities that 
adversaries are fielding. One of the underlying tenants of distributed lethality is that an 
adversary’s systems are tasked with finding and defeating U.S. Navy aircraft carriers in 
the early phases of a conflict (Center For Maritime International Security [CMISEC] 
2016). Distributed lethality assumes that the traditional CSG structure is not employed 
until late in a conflict and that the AFP is operating only with systems organic to the 
AFP. Air support during the distributed lethality phase is limited to the aircraft onboard 
the platforms within the AFP. 
Limited Self-Sustainment: Distributed lethality minimizes the number of high 
value units placed at risk. Distributed lethality missions are assumed to be short duration 
with major resupply happening outside of a contested area. 
Provide Viable Targeting Data: Distributed lethality tactical targeting data is 
assumed to be generated and networked by sensors and communication systems organic 
to the AFP platforms. 
Current or Near Future Resources: Very little in the development of new systems 
is proposed. Distributed lethality C2 can adapt with minimal equipment modification. 
Distributed lethality is largely an operational concept. 
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Force Adversary to React: Distributed lethality is an offensive posture designed 
specifically to force an adversary into a reactive mode. OPORDs that the adversary had 
in place before the initiation of a conflict must be challenged, allowing the U.S. Navy 
forces to operate as a cohesive whole while the adversary is forced to reconceive 
organizational and operational structure. 
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
This report implements distributed lethality through four interrelated concepts: the 
AFP; localized C3 within the AFP; a robust operations order; and assured 
communications with higher headquarters, typically a maritime operations center (MOC) 
located ashore or afloat (onboard a large command level ship). These concepts are 
illustrated at a high level by the DODAF operational viewpoint (OV-1) in Figure 3. 
Satellite communications may be intermittent, isolated to one platform in the AFP, or 
completely nonexistent. A functioning tactical data link is essential for localized AFP C3. 
Command and control authority over the AFP must be local when reliable external 
communications are not available. 
 
 OV-1 AFP Concept of Operations. Figure 3.
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The AFP is a task group of surface and subsurface combatants, USN auxiliary 
support ships (USNS), associated aircraft, and unmanned craft. Each AFP is tailored 
based on the platforms that are available for tasking and the mission to be accomplished. 
The AFP is assigned at the task group level; however, the command structure of the 
carrier task force (CTF) does not necessarily follow the joint warfare commander model. 
The scenario in Figure 4 assumes that satellite communications across the AFP 
are denied by the adversary early into a conflict or that satellite communications are 
restricted to a single platform. Lack of reliable long-range communications to higher 
headquarters means that localized C3 is key to the success of the AFP. This study 
investigates if tactical datalinks organic to the AFP can allow sharing of enough tactical 
C3 information and weapons queueing to perform the mission. Tactical data links enable 
the AFP component commanding officers to fight their units as a whole by coordinating 
with the other units of the AFP to do tasks such as cooperative engagement or 
coordinated fires. 
 
 OV-1 AFP Scenario. Adapted from Orndorff et al. (2015). Figure 4.
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The key innovation in the implementation of distributed lethality is the OPORD. 
The OPORD gives the AFP clear guidance on task group objectives, rules of 
engagement, commander’s guidance, and targeting priorities. The intent of the OPORD is 
to provide the AFP commander with enough information before executing a mission that 
the AFP commander is allowed to proceed with operations described in the OPORD 
without further discussion with the ashore MOC (or CTF afloat MOC). The OPORD is 
be supplemented by fragmentary orders (FRAGORD) when necessary, which direct the 
AFP commander to execute a different portion of the mission, change targeting priorities, 
or return to base. 
Figure 4 assumes that satellite communications are not available across the AFP 
early in a distributed lethality scenario and that reliable communications to a MOC are 
limited or nonexistent. Low bandwidth, time-late, message traffic between the MOC and 
the AFP may be available. Reliable exchange of information between the MOC and AFP 
is limited to short text messages. The AFP may be able to report general status at regular 
intervals, and to pass naval messages requesting clarification of commander’s intent; 
however, passing large volumes of hi-fidelity data such as sensor feeds or sharing a 
common operational picture is not possible. Communications from the MOC to the AFP 
is limited to FRAGORDs, recall of the entire AFP, or short intelligence reports while the 
AFP is within the scenario operational area. 
D. SCENARIOS 
Scenario development builds upon prior distributed lethality wargame studies 
conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Operations Research Department during 
the Summer and Fall 2015 courses of “OA4604 Wargaming Applications” (Orndorff et 
al. 2015). The wargames examined distributed lethality operating in the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea and the South China Sea. The South China Sea wargame was selected 
to develop the base scenario model due to the regional complexity, remoteness from 
traditional centralized C2 maritime operations centers, and large operational area. The 
scenario is scalable to adapt to other possible distributed lethality AFP operating areas 
such as the Mediterranean Sea, other constrained waterways, or open ocean operations 
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where the distributed lethality AFP may be operating as a single system or part of a larger 
strike group. 
The 2016 deployment of destroyers USS Decatur (DDG-73), USS Momsen 
(DDG-92), and USS Spruance (DDG-111) (Larter 2016) operating in the South China 
Sea (Kelly 2016) demonstrated distributed lethality tactics using traditional remote 
centralized C2 while under orders from the U.S. Navy Third Fleet headquarters in San 
Diego, CA. Unclassified publicly available information about this deployment and the 
OA4606 wargames led the distributed lethality team to propose a notional scenario 
around an AFP consisting of six surface platforms. 
1. Notional Scenario Development 
The notional base scenario shown in Figure 5 builds upon the Fall 2015 OA4604 
wargame (Orndorff et al. 2015) by adding six generic platforms to the area bounded by 
wargame scenario 2. Distributing the platforms for maximum coverage across the 
operational area places the platforms beyond the line-of-sight (LOS) horizon from the 
other AFP platforms. Tactical data links for C2 require beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) 
capability for the AFP to maintain coordinated C2 with higher authority and among the 
members of the AFP. This connectivity could be achieved by one or more platforms 
connecting to a satellite network that provides long-haul C2 data transport between the 




 Notional Base Scenario — South China Sea. Adapted from Orndorff Figure 5.
et al. (2015). 
The example in Figure 5 shows a single platform with satellite connectivity and 
the AFP platforms communicating by line of sight networks with two airborne relays 
(airborne relays are at the central meeting points of the green lines). The platform with 
satellite connectivity would serve as the relay to the distant command center and 
therefore would be a single point of failure in this network and a high value target to 
adversaries. Exchanging C2 information between an ashore centralized command center 
to the most distant platform in the AFP requires multiple relay points and 
communications technologies that may not be reliable or functioning at all times over the 
entire AFP operational area. 
The goal of the scenario is to exercise C2 information exchange and tactics in 
varying constructs that can be developed into a computer simulation model to compare 
the effectiveness and performance of different network topologies and tactics. The 
network concepts illustrated in Figure 6 (Baran 1964) were explained in a 1964 research 
paper by Paul Baran of the Rand Corporation. The distributed network topology is the 
foundation of the modern internet data routing architecture. Traditional U.S. Navy C2 
 17
hierarchies operate similarly to the centralized and decentralized network topology. A 
goal of scenario development is to explore possibilities of distributed C2 and compare it 
to the effectiveness of centralized and decentralized C2. 
 
 Centralized, Decentralized, and Distributed Networks. Source: Baran Figure 6.
(1964). 
The base scenario attempts to model the platforms shown in Figure 5 to establish 
a baseline network topology and simulated performance. The base scenario model is 
modified as shown in Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9 to represent centralized, 
decentralized, and distributed networks. 
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 Centralized Network Scenario. Adapted from Orndorff et al. (2015); Figure 7.
Baran (1964). 
The centralized network requires a central node that controls network information 
flow among network nodes and has connectivity to all other nodes. All information must 
transverse the central node and loss of the central node halts network information 
exchange. In the tactical arena, this would be catastrophic to C2 of an AFP. The 1950s- 
era Link 11 tactical data link is a centralized C2 network that revolves around the 
network control station. Satellite networks are also centralized when only one satellite is 
available to the AFP. 
 
 Decentralized Network Scenario. Adapted from Orndorff et al. Figure 8.
(2015) and Baran (1964). 
The decentralized network combines one or more centralized networks into a 
larger networked system of systems. A modern C2 tactical network that makes use of all 
available communications paths to function as a system of systems may operate in a 
decentralized fashion. Loss of a single central node degrades the network and AFP 
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capability but does not disable the entire network. Nodes that were connected to a 
disabled node must recognize their loss of connectivity and reconfigure for connection to 
another node—if connectivity to another node is available. Nodes unable to reconnect 
become isolated from the C2 structure. Severity of node loss is a function of the role the 
node plays in the network and the AFP mission. In the tactical arena, this could be 
catastrophic to C2 of an AFP if the path to C2 authority is disrupted. Affect to the AFP 
mission by loss of the single node, as shown in Figure 8, is dependent upon the functions 
the connected platforms are performing and the needs of the operational scenario. Loss of 
the connection between the central nodes breaks the decentralized network into isolated 
to centralized networks. 
 
 Distributed Network Scenario. Adapted from Orndorff et al. (2015); Figure 9.
Baran (1964). 
The distributed or mesh network can survive the loss of any node or network 
connection path. In the tactical arena, this should not be catastrophic to C2 of an AFP. 
Each node has two or more paths for C2 network connectivity. Loss of any single path 
allows the network to retain functionality within the AFP when the network C2 system 
architecture design functions via distributed C2 network paths. Loss of the single satellite 
path in Figure 9 only affects communications to nodes outside the local AFP. AFP 
systems architecture, tactics, and scenarios should consider cases where the AFP network 
is disconnected from satellite paths, or network nodes are radio silent under emission 
control protocols. 
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Modeling the differing network variations as scenarios enables performance 
comparisons and provides data to recommend the most effective network systems 
architecture to optimize networking technologies needed to build a seamless and 
survivable network that can be interoperable in the distributed lethality AFP scenarios. A 
goal of AFP scenario MBSE is to provide data for further analysis of system capabilities 
and to determine if current or planned architectures support or adapt to the distributed 
lethality mesh C2 networks and tactics, and if there are other capabilities (material or 
nonmaterial solutions) needed for distributed lethality C2. 
2. Scenario Model Simulation Development 
The distributed lethality command and control scenario models AFP 1 from 
scenario 2 of the Fall 2015 OA4604 wargame. As shown in Table 1, AFP 1 consists of 
three littoral combat ships (LCS) and two guided missile destroyers (DDG). The 
wargame gives the LCS an offensive anti-surface weapon (OASuW) with a range of 120 
nautical miles (nmi) and the DDG a Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) equipped 
with notional surface warfare capable seeker. For simplicity of the distributed lethality 
scenario model, the notional OASuW Tomahawk range is assumed to be more than  
1100 nmi. 




1 x Carrier (with 12 x FS-7)
1 x Landing Craft AFP1 AFP2 AFP3
2 x Amphibious Vessels 3 x Littoral Combat Ship 3 x Destroyer 2 x Destroyer
5 x Destroyers 2 x Destroyer 12 x Attack Aircraft 2 x High Speed Vessel
6 x Frigate 1 x Amphibious 12 x Small Missile Craft
5 x Corvette       Landing Craft
3 x Submarine 1 x Recon Aircraft 1 x Recon Aircraft 1 x Recon Aircraft
4 x Attack Aircraft 1 x Destroyer 1 x Destroyer 1 x Destroyer
4 x Jammer Aircraft
2 x Coast Guard Cutters
2 x Coast Guard Patrol Crafts
2 x Groups of  Fisherman Boats
Scenario 2: Adaptive Force Package
Blue Forces
Choice of one Adaptive Force Package
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The width and height of the OA4604 wargame scenario 2 was estimated as 900 by 
550 statute miles then rounded to 1000 by 500 nmi for ease of modeling the distributed 
lethality C2 scenario. DDG equipped with an 1100 nmi range notional OASuW 
Tomahawk can project power from any location inside the scenario box. AFP 2 with 
Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA)/Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) is not modeled 
because the F-35B joint strike fighter extends the offensive range to 1000+ nmi (similar 
to the DDG with TLAM). Red forces are not modeled because they can be anywhere 
within the scenario area, while the location of red forces may deter blue forces from 
actively transmitting C2 data, the purpose of the simulations are to determine the 
influence centralized, decentralized, and distributed networks have on C2 when applied 
to a distributed lethality AFP. Additional scenario and platform assumptions are located 
in Appendix B. 
The simplified base scenario in Figure 10 shows the 1000 by 500-mile area as an 




 AFP 1 Scenario OASuW Range. Figure 10.
The platforms are at the center of each red range ring with cyan rings representing 
the line of sight to the horizon and dashed blue rings representing the range of defensive 
missiles. The line of sight range is calculated based upon estimated mast height. The LCS 
mast height is estimated at 100 feet, giving 14 miles to the horizon. The DDG mast height 
is estimated at 160 feet, giving 18 miles to the horizon. LCS armed with the RIM-162 
evolved sea sparrow missile (ESSM) have a defensive range of 27 nmi. DDG armed with 
SM-2 standard missiles have a defensive range of 80 nmi. Sensor ranges are not modeled 
because they are assumed to be the operational range of embarked rotary wing aircraft. 
The MH-60 operational range is estimated at 460 nmi. With a five-platform AFP 
arranged as shown in Figure 10, the MH-60 can provide sensor coverage to any area 
within the scenario. 
Distributing the AFP platforms to maximum OASuW coverage could produce the 
physical layout shown in Figure 11.This layout represents an ideal mesh network for a 
five platform AFP to support decentralized C2 with each platform having two or more 
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network communication paths of equal distance to their nearest platforms, as represented 
by equilateral triangles with sides of 333 nmi. This configuration has two platforms (two 
LCS) with two paths, two platforms (both DDG) with three paths, and one platform 
(LCS) with four paths (for shorthand referred to as 2x2, 2x3, 1x4). The LCS are 
positioned 120 nmi from the lower boundary at equal intervals. LCS placement is the 
driving factor for AFP platform spacing due to the shorter OASuW strike ranges. DDG 
placement is secondary because of the long strike range of the notional OASuW TLAM. 
 
 AFP 1 Scenario Platform Separation. Figure 11.
Figure 11 yields a minimum threshold communication range of 333 nmi. The 
objective communication range is 1118 nmi (calculated by √1000 500 	) for corner-
to-corner communications if the platforms are permitted to navigate to any location 
within the 1000 x 500 nmi scenario boundary. Two options to support distributed 
lethality C2 at threshold or objective communication ranges are high frequency (HF) 
waveforms for BLOS or the use of an airborne node to relay LOS waveforms. Two 
airborne relays operating at 20,000 feet could provide coverage to the AFP. Relays are 
represented by shaded purple circles in Figure 12. The relays have a 200-mile line of 
sight range. A disadvantage using relays are the addition of a single point of failure in the 
network architecture. If one relay fails or is otherwise unavailable, two of the AFP 
platforms have no C2 communications path. Relays also increase the C2 message data 
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transport cost by a small amount. Transport cost is a factor of point-to-point transport 
time, data processing time at each node, and the probability of message loss due to RF 
propagation range or spectrum interference. The ideal data transport networking 
waveform is a single point platform-to-platform. 
 
 AFP 1 Scenario Platform with Airborne Relay. Figure 12.
Defensive range and sensor rages are not factors in this layout because the goal is 
to maximize OASuW coverage to distribute the lethality of the AFP. The AFP platform 
ranges could be decreased if overlapping offensive coverage or mutual defensive support 
is preferred for the mission. 
By the year 2025, it is possible the LCS may have longer range offensive 
weapons (Osborn 2017). Figure 13 shows the LCS and DDG each with 200 nmi 
offensive range. The DDG illustrated in this configuration have standard missile – 6 (SM-
6) capable OASuW (LaGrone 2017) with an estimated 200 nmi offensive range (IHS 
Global Limited 2016). The triangle geometries change, but the same pair of airborne 
relays at 20,000 feet continues to provide coverage. The purpose of Figure 13 is to 
illustrate communications ranges and offensive coverage of the scenario area when all 
five platforms have equal 200 nmi OASuW ranges. This scenario also represents an AFP 




 AFP 1 Scenario 2025 Notional OASuW Ranges. Figure 13.
Figure 14 removes the relay and range rings from Figure 13 to illustrate that 
ranges between LCS do not change when all five platforms have 200 nm OASuW range. 
The DDG can move further apart due to the change in OASuW range, but could also 
remain spaced at equal distances as shown previously in Figure 11. The notional OASuW 
Tomahawk is not shown in the 2025 scenarios, but it may remain on DDG if available. 
The presence or absence of the OASuW TLAM does not change the C2 communications 
architecture. The ranges of the notional 2025 scenario are not simulated because the goal 
of the simulation in this paper is to compare network types and their affect to C2 in the 
distributed lethality AFP. Note that the number of communication paths between the 
nodes is the same in Figure 14 and Figure 11. Figure 14 is shown to illustrate the minimal 
impact on distributed lethality C2 communications range if longer-range weapons are 




 AFP 1 Scenario 2025 Notional Communication Ranges. Figure 14.
The worst-case communications distances for the AFP are illustrated in Figure 15. 
This configuration places LCS on three corners, one DDG on the fourth corner and one 
DDG in the center. This layout does not optimize the OASuW coverage within the 
scenario area. This configuration illustrates that one airborne relay operating at 150,000 
feet, or two airborne relays operating at 50,000 feet are required for line of sight relays. 
Figure 15 is not simulated because the number of communication paths between nodes is 
potentially four paths at each node. Figure 15 is shown to reinforce the optimal C2 




 AFP 1 Scenario Worst-Case Communication Ranges. Figure 15.
An alternate scenario with the LCS across the diagonal shown in Figure 16 
provides less than ideal communications because the node locations do not provide 
symmetric communication paths. This configuration may actually reduce the four 
platforms on the corners to only two possible mesh network paths (from 2x2, 2x3, 4x1 in 
Figure 11, to 4x2, 1x4), unless a long haul BLOS waveform is available to connect the 
corner platforms to a third node. If a viable long-haul waveform could be available, this 
would be the ideal configuration due to four of the nodes having three communications 
paths and the fifth node having four communications paths. Two airborne relays at 




 AFP 1 Scenario LCS Alternate Layout. Figure 16.
Based upon the scenario layouts in the previous figures, the base scenario for 
decentralized C2 in Figure 11 is selected for model development. This scenario remains 
valid if the notional 2025 OASuW ranges extend to 200 nmi for all platforms. Two 
platforms have two communications paths; two platforms have three communications 
paths, one platform has four communications paths (2x2, 2x3, 4x1). The platform with 
four paths may be the preferred C2 authority in the AFP due to the central location for C2 
communications and the highest number of redundant paths; however, any platform in 
the network may assume the role of distributed lethality C2 authority. A five platform 
AFP in the Figure 11 configuration permits simulating the effects of two, three, or four 
redundant communication paths in the distributed lethality C2 environment. Five 
platforms are the minimal number to simulate the three network types of centralized, 
decentralized, and distributed. It is assumed that adding additional platforms or 
increasing redundant communication paths to five or more has little impact on the 
effectivity of distributed lethality C2. 
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3. Scenario C2 Networking Options 
The Link 22 waveform (Northrop Grumman 2013) satisfies most requirements for 
distributed lethality C2 tactical data link networking. Link 22 does not satisfy the desire 
for a low probability of detection waveform when omnidirectional antennas are 
employed. The Link 16 waveform satisfies most requirements for distributed lethality C2 
networking, except the need for BLOS range unless an airborne relay is employed. An 
external time reference (ETR) aids platforms operating in radio silence or with marginal 
network signal coverage to obtain and maintain network synchronization during 
distributed lethality C2 networking. Directional antenna systems can further reduce the 
probability of detection. Combining Link 16 and Link 22 with a smart router that 
performs the functions of a link monitoring and management tool (LMMT) can 
seamlessly route distributed lethality C2 data between tactical networks. Further research 
in these areas is recommended. 
Internet protocol (IP) based networks are also an option for tactical data links 
within the AFP if a reliable networking waveform is available that meets the desired 
criteria for availability, BLOS range, data throughput, security, low probability of 
detection, low probability of intercept, resistance to jamming, and interoperability among 
potential AFP and coalition platforms. 
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III. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
A. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE ANALYSIS 
Establishing a new concept of operations (CONOPS) for distributed lethality 
requires re-evaluation of the functional architecture used to execute the CONOPS. Since 
distributed lethality is being implemented in the near term, much of the physical 
architecture will involve ships, communications systems, and weapons that are already in 
the Navy inventory, with the innovation of distributed lethality being a new system of 
systems overlaying a new functional architecture atop the existing physical systems. 
In order to ensure that there is traceability from the CONOPS through the 
distributed lethality AFP analyzed in Chapter V of this report, the project used a three-
step process to develop requirements from the CONOPS, perform a functional 
decomposition on the C2 functions traced to the requirements architecture, and then 
allocate those functions to physical components in the adaptive force package. The 
researchers then analyzed alternate communications and command architectures to 
compare different approaches to operating an AFP. 
The three-step process used in this study was a system of systems modification to 
the systems engineering process developed in the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
manual, DOD Systems Engineering Fundamentals (Systems Management College, 
Department of Defense 2001), as shown in Figure 17 and summarized as follows: 
The Systems Engineering Process (SEP) … transforms needs and 
requirements into a set of system product and process descriptions, 
generate information for decision makers, and provides input for the next 
level of development. …(T)he process includes: inputs and outputs; 
requirements analysis; functional analysis and allocation; requirements 
loop; synthesis; design loop; verification; and system analysis and control. 
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 The Systems Engineering Process. Source: Systems Management Figure 17.
College, Department of Defense (2001). 
Figure 18 summarizes changes that were made to the DAU systems engineering 
process to adapt it to system of systems development. The process is similar; however, 
much of the functional analysis and synthesis becomes constrained by the characteristics 
of the constituent systems. 
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 SOS Engineering Process. Source: Systems Management College, Figure 18.
Department of Defense (2001). 
The outputs from this modified system of systems development process are a 
proposed system of systems architecture; appropriate measures of effectiveness that can 
be used throughout the system of systems life cycle, operational constraints associated 
with system of systems employment, and a constituent systems roadmap to recommend 
improvements to constituent systems that would improve system of systems performance. 
B. REQUIREMENTS ARCHITECTURE 
The four key concepts of distributed lethality, developed in Chapter II.C, are the 
AFP; localized C3 within the AFP; a robust operations order; and assured 
communications with higher headquarters (typically a MOC). These assumptions form 
the basis for the requirements architecture for distributed lethality, shown in Figure 19. 
System of Systems Engineering Process
Process Input
‐ Customer Needs / Objectives
‐ Missions











‐ System of Systems Architecture
‐ Validated Measures of 
Effectiveness
‐ Operational Constraints
‐ Constituent System Roadmap
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 Top Level Requirements Diagram. Figure 19.
1. Command and Control Requirements 
One of the key components of the AFP approach to distributed lethality is the 
delegation of many command decisions from the combatant commander (CCDR) to the 
AFP commander (CDR). This is in response to the high likelihood of the disruption of 
high-bandwidth satellite communications between the AFP and the CCDR. Much of the 
need for continuous communications between the AFP and the CCDR is reduced by a the 
CCDR issuing a well-defined OPORD prior to the beginning of a period in that a 
possibility exists of communications disruption, and the AFP CDR continuing to execute 
those operations until they are complete, or until conditions have changed to such an 
extent that extended communications between the AFP CDR and the CCDR are required. 
As shown in Figure 20, the principle command relationships are between vessels 





 Command and Control Requirements. Figure 20.
Figure 21 describes the basic considerations that go into defining a distributed 
lethality OPORD. These characteristics map to those defined in Chapter II.B. The 
composition is flexible both based on available forces and the AFP mission, but can also 
be tailored via weapons loadout to address different threats. Designation of an operations 
area is important—distributed lethality missions should be confined both in geography 
and in duration to match the area that can be controlled by the weapons and sensors 
organic to the AFP, and to enable multiple AFPs to operate with reduced probability of 
friendly fire or overlapping sensor envelopes. By geographic planning, the CCDR can use 
multiple AFPs, each providing sea control over a designated geographic area, to achieve 
theater-level operational objectives. The rules of engagement designated for an AFP will 
need to extend beyond those used in the past, elaborating more on situations in that the 
AFP CDR can designate changes in sensor and weapons posture, and can, at their 
discretion, escalate or deescalate while keeping within pre-designated scenarios. Critical 
to this is establishing high-level criteria that will require the AFP to withdraw to a 
position where extended communications with the CCDR can take place to describe 
departures from the scenarios used to develop a particular OPORD. These may include 
things like unexpected adversary high value targets, degradation of a particular AFP 
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capability, or a designated time. The communications plan defines channels and 
schedules; potentially this could involve long periods of the AFP operating under 
emissions control (EMCON) restrictions that permit breaking communications silence 
only when specific criteria in the rules of engagement (ROE) are met. Finally, the 
OPORD will delegate certain authorities to the AFP CDR beyond those that are typically 
spelled out in the ROE. 
 
 OPORD Considerations. Figure 21.
2. Communications Requirements 
Two separate sets of communications requirements will need to be developed—a 
local datalink with high bandwidth and low probability of intercept/probability of 
detection characteristics to enable communications between AFP units, and a HHQ reach 
back circuit, with high-reliability, very low bandwidth characteristics. The distributed 
lethality CONOPS minimizes the communications necessary between the AFP and HHQ; 
however, when conditions deviate from the OPORD, it is critical that the AFP notify 




 Communications Requirements. Figure 22.
3. Adaptive Force Package Mission Areas 
The AFP construct exists in order to meet an offensive warfare need; as such, its 
primary focus is on being able to function as a cohesive unit. Mission areas are shown in 
Figure 23; as the focus of this report is on C2, no descriptions of these functions are 
provided. 
 
 Adaptive Force Package Mission Areas. Figure 23.
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4. Flexible Force Structure 
The final set of requirements for the distributed lethality AFP is a flexible force 
structure. Third Offset Warfare (Hagel 2014), of which distributed lethality is the means 
for employment of naval forces in a third offset strategy, requires a force of capable and 
flexible officers, sailors, ships, aircraft, submarines, and unmanned vehicles. This is 
summarized by four requirements: Every platform a sensor; Every platform a 
communicator; Every platform a shooter; and Every platform a situational commander. 
This structure is shown in Figure 24. 
 
 Flexible Force Structure Requirements. Figure 24.
“Every platform a sensor” establishes requirements that the AFP, when not 
operating in EMCON, share sensor-level data with other platforms in the AFP. This 
enables the development of cooperative sensing schemes, increasing the performance of 
legacy sensors. “Every platform a communicator” stops short of directly specifying a 
communications architecture; however, it does imply that every platform is able to 
participate as a node in the AFP intranet, and, if the ship has the physical footprint, every 
platform be able to provide the high-reliability datalink to HHQ. “Every platform a 
shooter” means that that all AFP platforms have offensive capability and that the 
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platform(s) with the best solution to engage a hostile target may receive direction from 
the C2 structure to engage that target. Finally, “Every platform a situational commander” 
ensures that the best situated platform can be delegated at least some command function 
under the AFP construct, either based on capability, or as a planned deviation in the event 
that the AFP CDR can no longer participate on the network. 
C. FUNCTIONAL FLOWS 
This paper focuses on evaluating C2 structures for an AFP, and this chapter 
focuses on the functions necessary to develop and evaluate different C2 concepts for an 
AFP. One of the initial concerns while developing a functional architecture was a 
question of how to capture the control concept of delegation. This distributed lethality C2 
study proposes capturing delegation and other control functions by treating the mission 
OPORD as a separate portion of the physical architecture. This provides several 
advantages: it provides a structure for capturing control decisions and evaluating different 
control architectures; it enables future integration of autonomous and semi-autonomous 
systems into the AFP architecture by providing a shared component between manned and 
unmanned platforms; and it provides a structure for force commanders to examine 
different mission constructs. 
This distributed lethality C2 study does not examine all of the implications of this 
construction. The architecture change focuses on demonstrating improved command and 
control flexibility. 
Figure 25 demonstrates the functional flow under an OPORD construct that 
reserves engagement authorities to higher headquarters (HHQ). A target is identified by 
an AFP unit. The unit follows guidance in the OPORD requiring all units to request 
weapons release authorization from higher command authority. This request is 
transmitted over the intra-AFP communications network. The AFP commander reviews 
the request against the OPORD, and refers the request to HHQ. HHQ reviews the request, 
and approves or rejects the weapons release request, which then has to flow back down 




 OASuW Engagement Functional Flow — Traditional C2. Figure 25.
When extra-AFP communications are robust, this decision-making cycle may be 
effective due to high-bandwidth reach back communications; however, in the event that 
communications are reduced, or in the case that multiple AFPs are requesting 
engagement authority, the delay associated with HHQ review may result in timelines that 
preclude successful OASuW engagements. 
Contrast the functional flow in Figure 25 with that shown in Figure 26, in which 
the distributed lethality construct has delegated engagement authority to the AFP 
commander under conditions specified in the OPORD. In this case, the request to 
authorization cycle is reduced from 12 steps to eight steps, and both the long-latency 
communications step between the AFP and HHQ and the potential to overload the 
decision-making capability of HHQ is avoided in the second construct. 
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 OASuW Engagement Functional Flow — Distributed Lethality C2. Figure 26.
D. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
A general functional decomposition for surface warfare over the horizon 
engagements was proposed in “Organic Over-The-Horizon Targeting for the 2025 
Surface Fleet” (Johnson et al. 2015). The architecture is shown in Figure 27. 
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 Organic OTHT Surface-to-Surface Functional Decomposition. Figure 27.
Source: Johnson et al. (2015). 
The AFP construct in this distributed lethality C2 study continues to employ 
branches 2.0 “Conduct Maritime ISR” and 3.0 “Employ Weapon(s)”; however, in this 
study we propose an alternative functional architecture for 1.0 “Execute Command and 
Control,” as expanded upon in the following paragraphs. 
The alternate functional architecture described in Figure 28 forms the basis of the 
systems analysis chapter of this report. Referring to the architecture in Figure 27, 
Function 1.0 is broken into a command function and a control function, and Function 1.2 
is elevated to a first level communicate function. This new structure allows for system 
analysis of a change in command structure, through the assignment of different decision 
points to simulate changes to the OPORD, and the evaluation of different 
communications architectures for the communicate function. The performance of 
competing command, control, and communications systems are assessed in detail in 
Chapter IV, with a description of metrics associated with those top-level functions. 
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 Revised Functional Hierarchy. Figure 28.
To the functional architecture proposed in (Johnson et al. 2015), this study divides 
the first element into three elements to enhance distributed lethality C2: 
1. The “Command of AFP” function designates both the operational and 
tactical command functions associated with distributed lethality. 
Command functions are the class of functions associated with evaluating 
information and making decisions. 
2. The “Control of AFP Elements” function is associated with assignment of 
specific tasks to specific units of the AFP. Control functions are the class 
of functions that involve moving physical objects, changing operations 
modes for sensors, and establishing communications states (EMCON or 
other postures). 
3. The “Communicate” function is associated with sharing information and 
reports with higher headquarters and other units in the AFP. 
This decomposition allows for more granular definition of functions and the 
distribution of functions across the AFP to a level that lets sensors, weapons, and control 
be shared across the AFP. One possible end-state of this architecture allows for the AFP 
commander embarked on one vessel to engage an enemy target sensed on a second vessel 
or another AFP asset with a weapon from a third party. 
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IV. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
A. DISTRIBUTED LETHALITY PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
Distributed lethality doctrine is developing and subject to change as operational 
experience matures and technologies evolve. The C2 physical architecture for distributed 
lethality is based upon adaptations to current U.S. Navy C2 doctrine, communication and 
warfare systems. This architecture follows the distributed lethality characteristic of using 
current or near future technologies. 
B. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS 
While this study focuses primarily on the evaluation of command, control, and 
communications architectures for distributed lethality, it also establishes a physical 
architecture for the distributed lethality system of systems. At its highest level, the 
distributed lethality force construct can be broken down into four architecture 
components: headquarters, networks, an operations order, and the adaptive force package. 
Figure 29 shows this architecture. 
 
 Distributed Lethality Physical Architecture. Figure 29.
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This is an expansion of typical physical architecture, in that it includes both the 
personnel in the headquarters component and the data and processes documented in the 
OPORD component. The INCOSE definition of physical architecture allows that, “A 
system element is a discrete part of a system that can be implemented to fulfill design 
properties. A system element can be hardware, software, data, humans, processes (e.g., 
processes that provide a service to users), procedures (e.g., operator instructions), 
facilities, materials, and naturally occurring entities (e.g., water, organisms, and 
minerals), or any combination of these ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 (ISO 2015)” (SEBoK 
authors 2017). 
1. Headquarters 
The distributed lethality headquarters is typically the numbered fleet MOC 
assigned to a GCC, serving as the maritime component commander (MCC). Below the 
headquarters component, there are four sub-components: Extra-AFP relationships, a force 
allocation, a link to higher headquarters (HHQ)/fleet/regional combatant commander 
(RCC), and a set of tasking priorities. Figure 30 shows this architecture. 
 
 Distributed Lethality Headquarters Physical Architecture. Figure 30.
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The “Extra-AFP Relationships” component in Figure 30 are interfaces to other 
units operating in and out of theater, including other components of the Department of 
Defense, national assets, and allies. “Force Allocation” component in Figure 30 are the 
forces available to the HHQ from which an AFP can be drawn. “Link to HHQ/Fleet/
RCC” component in Figure 30 is the processes through which a HHQ coordinates AFP 
tasking with other component commanders. “Tasking Priorities” component in Figure 30 
is the process through which HHQ develops priorities that are fed to the AFP commander 
via the OPORD. 
2. Networks 
In general, there are two distinct sets of communication networks required for the 
operation of an AFP. Extra-AFP communications are the systems through which the AFP 
commander interfaces with HHQ and other participants in the GCC area of responsibility. 
Intra-AFP communications permit AFP platform coordination during execution of the 
AFP OPORD. These components are shown in Figure 31. 
 
 Distributed Lethality Network Physical Architecture. Figure 31.
Extra-AFP communications are a family of systems characterized by high 
reliability systems optimized for operation in contested spectrum environments. Extra-
AFP communications are detailed in the concept of operations. While this study does not 
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detail or allocate requirements to specific systems, some existing systems operating in the 
high frequency (HF) through extremely high frequency (EHF) bands may currently meet 
the requirements. 
Intra-AFP communications are critical to the AFP C2 concept developed in this 
study because they are the backbone for information exchange and sensor networking. 
a. Intra-AFP Communications 
Intra-AFP communications components are tactical data links onboard on all 
platforms participating in the AFP. This study does not assign a specific tactical data link 
to perform C2 data transport. The data link is simply the transport medium to be selected 
based upon communication range and other desired properties discussed in Chapter II.D. 
The tactical data link for the intra-AFP communications system is assumed to be a multi-
user networked system that is interoperable with USN, joint, and coalition forces that are 
components of the AFP. 
Three communications network architectures are modeled for physical 
architecture comparisons: centralized, decentralized, and distributed. The network 
architectures of a five platform AFP are illustrated in Figure 32, Figure 33, and Figure 34. 
 
 Centralized C2 Network Architecture. Figure 32.
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In the centralized C2 network architecture of Figure 32, platform two is the 
central node. No redundant communication transport paths exist. Loss of the node at 
platform two breaks the intra-AFP communications network. Under this network, any 
platform may be the AFP commander. Transport cost when platform two is AFP 
commander is a single hop for point-to-point waveform communications or two hops 
when airborne relays are required to bridge the distance between platforms. Transport 
cost when any platform other than platform two is AFP commander is two hops for point-
to-point waveform communications or four hops when airborne relays are required. 
 
 Decentralized C2 Network Architecture. Figure 33.
In the decentralized C2 network architecture of Figure 33, platform two is the 
central node connecting all platforms into a single decentralized network. Multiple 
redundant communication transport paths exist. Loss of one path to any node does not 
severely degrade the intra-AFP communications network. Loss of any node, other than 
two, only affects the lost node. Loss of the node at platform two splits the network into 
two separated networks. Under this network, any platform may be the AFP commander. 
The decentralized network physical architecture should include a smart command 
and control processor (C2P) to route messages via the fastest available transport path. 
Network protocols and C2 messaging design should accommodate multiple copies of 
redundant transmissions when routing messages. A five-node decentralized 
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communications network could result in one original C2 message and three duplicate 
copies of the original message. 
For example, platform one addresses a C2 message to platform three and 
transmits the message via both available paths to platform two and four (without smart 
C2P). Platform two forwards the message via both available paths to platform three and 
five. Platform three receives the original message at the same time platform five receives 
the duplicate message from platform two. Platform five forwards the duplicate message 
to platform three. Simultaneously, platform two receives a duplicate of the original 
message from platform four and forwards two copies to platform three and five, resulting 
in platform three receiving the original C2 message and three duplicate copies. 
Network routing is beyond the scope of this study. Network routing is highlighted 
here as a need for additional study to optimize network design with smart network C2P 
routing that minimizes copies of message traffic, minimizes transport time/costs, and 
provides a robust message processing design in the event of duplicate messages. A smart 
C2P architecture would sense the network routing paths and route the C2 message only 
from platform one to two to three. A secondary benefit of smart routing is a reduction in 
RF radiations by eliminating redundant transmissions by AFP platforms. 
Transport cost when platform two is AFP commander is a single hop for point-to-
point waveform communications or two hops when airborne relays are required. 
Transport cost when any platform other than platform two is AFP commander is two to 




 Distributed C2 Network Architecture. Figure 34.
In the distributed C2 network architecture of Figure 34, no central node exists. 
The maximum number of redundant communication transport paths exist. Loss of a 
single path to any node does not severely degrade the intra-AFP communications 
network. Loss of any node only affects the lost node. Under this network, any platform 
may be the AFP commander. The distributed network should employ smart C2P routing 
to function via fastest transport path and provide a robust message processing design in 
the event of duplicate messages. Transport cost when platform two is AFP commander is 
a single hop for point-to-point waveform communications or two hops when airborne 
relays are required. Transport cost when any platform other than platform two is AFP 
commander is two to four hops for point-to-point waveform communications or four hops 
when airborne relays are required. 
3. Operation Order 
The OPORD is the ruleset that establishes parameters under which the AFP is 
required to operate. While OPORDs have been used in military operations for decades, 
this study moves the definition of the AFP OPORD into the SOS physical architecture. 
This placement in the physical architecture is critical for determining the characteristics 
of the communications between the AFP and HHQ (extra-AFP communications, 
discussed in the previous chapter), and in setting parameters for the functional analysis of 
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the AFP. The components of the OPORD considered in this study are shown in  
Figure 35. 
 
 OPORD Physical Architecture. Figure 35.
The “AFP Command Structure” component in Figure 35 designates the unit that 
will serve as the AFP commander and may designate other roles specifically to other AFP 
platforms. Assignment of this structure is normally at the discretion of the AFP 
commander. 
The “AFP Missions” component in Figure 35 are the specific goals assigned to 
the AFP. HHQ coordinates tasking priorities with other force providers supporting the 
GCC, and the AFP missions are a combination of supported tasking, in which the AFP is 
the lead in completing the mission, and supporting tasking, in which the AFP is providing 
the capability to another force supporting the GCC. 
The “Delegated Authorities” component in Figure 35 defines what decisions are 
to be made or delegated by the AFP commander. The System Analysis in Chapter V of 
this report examines the delays and communication overhead incurred when all decisions 
must be made at a level above the AFP commander; this study demonstrates the 
operational flexibility and autonomy gained by pushing decisions forward even as the 
communications environment becomes contentious. 
The entry and exit criteria components in Figure 35 define conditions that change 
the roles and permissions under which the AFP commander operates. A simple example 
of this would be a time window around an OASuW mission: “At 0800, engage all surface 
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combatants from (a country) positively identified with a (sufficient) track quality. 
Engagement will continue until 1200, or until 30% of (OASuW weapons) are expended.” 
The “Reserved Authorities” component in Figure 35 are tasks or conditions under 
which the AFP commander MUST contact HHQ before proceeding. 
4. AFP Units 
The AFP may consist of any mix of the family of systems shown in Figure 36. 
The AFP component construct allows for operational flexibility depending upon the 
platforms available to HHQ. The AFP model in the physical architecture of this study 
consists of two DDGs and three LCS. A physical architecture with five platforms permits 
modeling the three network types under study. Other platforms may join the architecture 
as mission requirements and platform availability dictate. The distributed lethality AFP 
architecture can be extended to include any interoperable platform capable of 
participating in the intra-AFP communications network. 
 
 AFP Units. Figure 36.
Figure 36 includes a second level of physical decomposition to show the typical 
physical systems required for a platform to be used as an AFP unit. The distributed 
lethality construct developed by this study includes both offensive and defensive 
weapons capabilities on each platform; “If it floats, it fights” (Rowden 2016). 
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V. SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
A. SIMULATION DESCRIPTION 
The distributed lethality physical architecture model and simulation results in this 
chapter are built using ExtendSim version 9.2 software program (Imagine That 2015). 
The simulation is based on the South China Sea wargame scenario described in Chapter 
II.D. The simulation models C2 message transmission and reception across a five 
platform AFP. Modeling and simulation provides an understanding of the C2 message 
behavior based on simulation parameters and network physical architectures. Several test 
cases are evaluated in Chapter V.B to maximize network performance and draw 
recommendation and conclusions. The simulation model for this simulation is new with 
no external peer review or model validation outside of the analysis performed by the 
modeling team. 
1. Block Diagram 
The ExtendSim simulation is built following the block diagram in Figure 37. This 
block diagram is based upon Figure 25 and Figure 26 in functional flows described in 
Chapter III. 
 
 Simulation Block Diagram. Figure 37.



















The block diagram emulates C2 communications for a single AFP with five 
platforms. The communication flow in Figure 37 shows the message path from one node 
to any other node. It demonstrates two categories of messages the AFP exchanges and the 
process cycle for each message type. The messages categories are: C2 messages and non-
C2 messages. This architecture defines C2 messages as messages sent by a commander to 
a subordinate platform directing mission assignment, engagement or weapons control, 
and the corresponding response from the platform. Non-C2 messages are all other 
platform-to-platform data exchanges within the AFP, including situational awareness data 
or other information not related to C2. Non-C2 message transfer within the AFP occurs at 
a lower transmission priority than C2 messages and may flow through the AFP over the 
same tactical data link used for C2. The AFP commander may route the C2 message to 
HHQ if a C2 network connection exists. C2 message replies from HHQ flow back to the 
AFP platform that originated the C2 message. 
2. Parameters 
Parameters for C2 network simulations are approximations of anticipated network 
transport times and are the primary input variables for all simulations. C2 message 
parameters for the simulation are shown Table 2. The simulation models timing 
parameters for transmission and reception of C2 messages. Message transmit processing 
time is the time that it takes the AFP platform to transmit a C2 message to the network 
from initiation of an operator or automatic message transmit request. Message receive 
processing time is the time the AFP platform or HHQ receives the message from the C2 
network, the message is reviewed by human operators, and a response is available for 
transmission back to the originator of the C2 message. The parameters are given a normal 
distribution or a triangular distribution to simulate variations in network and human 
response times. C2 message receive processing time within the AFP and HHQ have a 
triangular distribution because the C2 messages require human approval for items such as 
operation orders and HHQ input. The minimum, maximum and most likely values in the 
triangular distributions are rounded estimates from the research team based on their 
professional experiences. The mean and standard deviations in the normal distributions 
are estimated values. 
 57
Table 2. C2 Message Parameters 
Parameters Distribution Values 
Message Transmit Processing Time Normal 
Mean = 1.5 seconds 
Standard Deviation = 0.15 seconds 
Message Receive Processing Time 
AFP C2 Message 
Triangular 
Minimum = 1 minute 
Most likely = 2 minutes 
Maximum = 5 minutes 
Message Receive Processing Time 
HHQ C2 Message 
Triangular 
Minimum = 5 minutes 
Most likely = 15 minutes 
Maximum = 30 minutes 
 
Non-C2 messages are all other platform-to-platform data exchanges within the 
AFP, including situational awareness data or other information not related to C2. The 
simulation models non-C2 message transmission and reception between AFP platforms. 
Non-C2 message timing parameters are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Non-C2 Message Parameters 
Parameters Distribution Values 
Message Transmit Processing Time Normal 
Mean = 100 milliseconds 
Standard Deviation = 10 milliseconds 
Message Receive Processing Time 
Non-C2 Message 
Normal 
Mean = 100 milliseconds 
Standard Deviation = 10 milliseconds 
 
Table 4 lists general message or environmental parameters used by the simulation. 
Message transmit rates specify the frequency non-C2 messages are repeated by a single 
AFP platform. Message dropout rate is the probable message loss rate during 
transmission due to environmental spectrum effects or interference. The C2 message 
percentage is the percentage of all messages being produced by a single AFP platform 
that are high priority C2 messages. 
Table 4. General Parameters 
Parameters Values 
Message Transmit Rate 12 seconds 
Message Dropout Rate 10% 




a. Measure of Effectiveness 
The NAVSURFOR liaison to the Naval Postgraduate School recommended that 
the distributed lethality C2 research team use “missile-off-the-rail” as a basis for MOE. 
The distributed lethality C2 team refined this guidance to use time from detection until 
the time of engagement of a threat—MOE 3: C2 Message Cycle—as the primary 
operational MOE. These MOEs were further developed into Measures of Performance 
(MOP) for the scenario and simulation. The MOEs and MOPs are traced to functions in 
Figure 27, Figure 28 and Table 5. 
Table 5. MOE/MOP 
Function Measure of Effectiveness Measure of Performance 
1.2 Communicate 
MOE 1: Message 
Transmission Success Rate 
MOP 1.1: C2 Message Success Percentage 
MOP 1.2: Non C2 Message Success 
Percentage 
MOE 2: Message Delivery 
Time 
MOP 2.1: C2 Message Delivery Time 
MOP 2.2: Non-C2 Message Delivery Time 
1.2.1 Receive Intelligence 
MOE 3: C2 Message Cycle MOP 3.1: Time to Engage from Request 
1.2.2 Direct Assets 
 
b. Simulation Metrics 
Simulation metrics are based upon stakeholder inputs, which were turned into 
MOE and MOPs in Table 5 and are collected as outputs of simulation runs for each case. 
The metrics are then fed into post-simulation data evaluation. The metrics are: 
 Message Delivery Success Rate: This metric reports the percentage of 
messages delivered successfully for C2 messages and the non-C2 
messages. 
 Message Mean Time to Delivery: This metric reports the mean time to 
deliver C2 messages and non-C2 messages. 
 Time to Engage from Request: This metric reports the amount of time it 
takes a message to complete the C2 processing cycle. 
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4. Assumptions/Constraints 
The selected assumptions and constraints describe the simulation set boundaries. 
The simulation contains the following assumptions and constraints: 
 The simulation begins when an AFP platform generates a C2 request and 
ends when that platform receives a decision from the commander. 
 The simulation is a 24-hour scenario resulting in approximately 7200 
messages per run. 
 The AFP platforms only send a given message once; there are no 
retransmissions based on failed message delivery. While retransmissions 
are common in networks, this is a reasonable assumption for this 
simulation because this simulation is looking at message paths, which are 
the same for single transmissions or multiple transmissions. 
 The dropout rate is the same for every communication link in the 
simulation. 
 The dropout rate does not vary with transmission distance. 
B. TEST CASES 
The test cases investigate C2 architectural behaviors based upon the parameters 
established in Chapter V.A.2. The cases compare C2 networking architecture and AFP 
platform effectiveness. The following test cases are analyzed: 
 Test Case 1: Network Architecture 
 Test Case 2: AFP Commander 
 Test Case 3: Jamming Environment 
 Test Case 4: Command Decisions 
In each test case, the output metrics from Chapter V.A.3 are compared between 
the independent variables. Statistical testing is used to determine statistical significance. 
The statistical tests are two sample t-tests assuming unequal variances and paired t-tests 
when appropriate. The level of significance used is α = 0.05. 
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1. Test Case 1: Network Architecture 
This test case compares the three types of network architectures (centralized, 
decentralized, and distributed). Test case 1 holds all the parameters constant with the only 
variant factor being the network architecture types. The results of ten simulation runs for 
each network type (centralized, decentralized, and distributed) are summarized in Table 6 
to show the collected mean output data for each of the network architectures. 
Table 6. Network Architecture Comparison 
Network 
Mean Message Delivery 
Time (Seconds) 
Message Delivery Success 
Time from Request to 








Centralized 0.20 130.18 90% 68% 21.49 
Decentralized 0.20 130.00 90% 79% 21.25 
Distributed 0.20 130.85 90% 80% 21.02 
 
The results are as expected for the given network types. The distributed network 
was expected to have the highest success rate for C2 messages delivery because of 
multiple redundant communication paths for each platform in the AFP. The decentralized 
network performs almost as efficient as the distributed network because it contains 
similar communication paths. The centralized network has no redundant paths for the 
platforms and has the lowest C2 messages delivery success rate.  
A two-sample t-test is performed to determine the key metrics and compare the 
network architecture effectiveness between each other. The simulation output data for all 
Table 6 test cases is located in Table A-1 of Appendix A, and the t-test analysis is 
available in Table C-1 of Appendix C. Based on the P-values shown in Table 7 and  
Table 8, we can conclude the C2 message delivery success percentage, and time from 
request to engagement metrics are statistically significant between the network 
architectures. As a result, it can be determined that the distributed network architecture 
performs the best followed closely by decentralized networks. Centralized networks have 
the lowest performance. This analysis supports our expectations that distributed networks 
perform the best based on our metrics. In addition, the difference between time from 
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request to engage may only be 28 seconds, but even a small amount of time can have an 
impact on operational effectiveness. 
Table 7. C2 Message Delivery Success P-Value 
C2 Delivery Success 
Alternative Hypothesis P-value 
Distributed > Centralized 1.91E-14 
Distributed > Decentralized 0.0009 
Decentralized > Centralized 1.09E-12 
 
Table 8. Time from Request to Engagement P-Value 
Time from Request to Engagement 
Alternative Hypothesis P-value 
Distributed > Centralized 9.50E-07 
Distributed > Decentralized  0.0024 
Decentralized > Centralized 0.004 
 
2. Test Case 2: AFP Commander 
Test case 2 varies which AFP platform performs single point C2 message 
forwarding from within the AFP to HHQ to simulate a case where satellite 
communications are available to a single AFP platform, as illustrated in the OV-1 AFP 
Concept of Operations. This case is important from an operational viewpoint because it 
indicates the best platforms to forward C2 messages dependent upon network topology 
and recommends geometry of the AFP. The simulations ran ten times for each platform 
as a C2 message forwarder. The distributed network is chosen for all simulations and all 




Table 9. AFP Platform as C2 Forwarder 
AFP 
Platform 
Mean Message Delivery 
Time (Seconds) 
Message Delivery Success 
Time from Request to 








LCS 1 0.20 130.01 90% 80% 21.02 
LCS 2 0.20 130.85 90% 80% 21.02 
LCS 3 0.20 130.26 90% 80% 20.98 
DDG 1 0.20 130.08 90% 81% 21.00 
DDG 2 0.20 130.54 90% 80% 21.03 
 
The results show the system is indifferent with respect to which AFP platform is 
the C2 message forwarder. This is consistent with our rationale that it should not matter 
which platform is forwarding C2 messages to HHQ. 
A two-sample t-test is performed for this test case. The simulation output data for 
all Table 9 test cases is located in Table A-2 of Appendix A, and the t-test analysis is 
available in Table C-2 of Appendix C. Based on the two sample test analysis results, 
there are no statistical differences on which AFP platform forwards the C2 message to 
HHQ. 
3. Test Case 3: Simulated Contested Spectrum Environment 
This test case focuses on the network architecture performance under a simulated 
contested spectrum environment between the AFP platforms nodes. For this test case, the 
C2 message dropout rate parameter was changed to a uniform distribution that varies 
from zero to 100. Fifty random samples were chosen from the distribution and used for 
each network type. Each sample was used as an input parameter for a single run. 
Therefore, the simulations were run 50 times for each network type. All the other 
simulation parameters remained constant. The message dropout rate network architecture 
results are in Figure 38. 
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 C2 Success in Simulated Contested Spectrum Environment. Figure 38.
Figure 38 illustrates that message dropout probability has a significant impact on 
C2 delivery success. To compare the networks, a paired t-test analysis was performed for 
this test case because each network type had the same input parameters. The simulation 
output data for Figure 38 test cases is located in Table A-3 of Appendix A, and the t-test 
analysis is available in Table C-3 of Appendix C. Based on the P-values in Table 10, we 
can conclude the C2 message delivery time and time from request to engagement metrics 
are statistically significant between the network architectures. As a result, it can be 
determined that the distributed network architecture performs the best followed closely 
by decentralized networks. Centralized networks have the lowest performance. 
Table 10. C2 Success Rate Paired T-Test 
Alternative Hypothesis P-value 
Distributed > Centralized 3.49E-08 
Distributed > Decentralized  8.50E-07 
Centralized < Decentralized  1.55E-07 
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4. Test Case 4: Command Decisions 
This test case analyzes the effects of changing the command authority level and 
its ability to exchange C2 messages in a simulated contested spectrum environment. The 
test case changes the command authority from HHQ to the AFP commander and looks at 
the impact of this change to the C2 message dropout rate. Test case 4 executed two 
separate runs. In the first run, all parameters were constant with the only variant factor 
being the decision authority. The simulations ran ten times for each authority type. In the 
second run, the C2 message dropout rate parameter was altered by changing it to a 
uniform distribution with variance from zero to 100%. Fifty random samples were chosen 
from the distribution and used for each command authority. Each sample was used as an 
input parameter for a single run. Therefore, the simulations were run 50 times for each 
command authority. The distributed network architecture is employed and all other 
simulation parameters remained constant. The output simulation results for the command 
authority are shown in Table 11 and Figure 39. 
Table 11. Command Authority Levels 
Command 
Authority 
Mean Message Delivery 
Time (Seconds) 
Message Delivery Success 
Time from Request to 








AFP Platform 0.20 130.46 90% 90% 4.34 
HHQ 0.20 130.85 90% 80% 21.02 
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 C2 Message Command Level Dropout Probability. Figure 39.
Figure 39 shows that the message dropout probability has a significant impact on 
C2 delivery success. The plot also shows that for networks in which the AFP is the 
command authority, the performance is significantly better in terms of C2 message 
delivery as the message dropout probability increases. 
To compare statistically, a two-sample t-test is performed to determine the key 
metrics and compare the command authority to each other in a nominal environment 
where message dropout rate is constant. The simulation output data for Figure 39 test 
cases is located in Table A-4 of Appendix A, and the t-test analysis is available in 0 of 
Appendix C. Based on the P-values shown in Table 12 and Table 13, we can conclude the 
C2 message delivery time and time from request to engagement metrics are statistically 
significant between the command authority. As a result, it can be determined that 
OPORDs with the AFP commander as the decision authority will perform better than 
cases where HHQ is the command authority. This is as expected because there are fewer 
communication paths and interactions that need to occur and that the AFP commander 
will be more focused on the current mission compared to HHQ, which will be focused on 
multiple missions. 
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Table 12. Command Authority — C2 Message Delivery Success P-Value 
Delivery Success 
Alternative Hypothesis P-value 
HHQ Authority < Local AFP Authority 4.95E-13 
 
Table 13. Command Authority — Time from Request to Engagement P-Value 
Time from Request to Engagement 
Alternative Hypothesis P-value 
HHQ Authority < Local AFP Authority 9.10E-23 
 
The next statistical test is a paired t-test analysis where the message dropout rate 
applies a uniform distribution. The simulation output data and t-test analysis are shown in 
in Table C-5 of Appendix C. Based on the P-values shown in Table 14, we can conclude 
the C2 message delivery time and time from request to engagement metrics are 
statistically significant between decision authorities in a simulated contested spectrum 
environment. This result also supports the conclusion that performance is better when the 
AFP commander set as the decision authority (compared to HHQ as the command 
authority). 
Table 14. Command Authority Dropout Rate Probability 
Alternative Hypothesis P-value 
HHQ Authority < Local AFP Authority 2.79E-22 
 
C. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
A design of experiments (DOE) is performed based on the simulation parameters. 
The DOE analysis provides some insight into which of the simulation parameters affect 
the simulation output metrics. A full factorial DOE was designed choosing the simulation 
metrics described in Chapter V.A.3 as the responses and the simulation parameters 
described in Chapter V.A.2 as the factors. Based on the factors, the number of runs 
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required for this full factorial is 288 runs. The DOE factors and values are shown in 
Table 15. 




NonC2 Message Processing time 0.1 2 
C2 Message Processing time 1.5 5 
NonC2 Message Receiving Processing Time 0.1 2 
AFP C2 Message Receiving Processing Time 60 300 
HHQ C2 Message Receiving Processing Time 300 1800 
Dropout Rate 0 0.35 0.6 
Networks Decentralized Distributed Centralized 
 
The following tables summarizing the DOE results show significant factors and 
the response variable sensitivity to each factor. The full set of DOE results are shown in 
Table A-5 of Appendix A. Each table describes log worth (-log10(p-value)) and p-values 
for each of the metric parameters. 
1. C2 Message Delivery Success 
Figure 40 shows the C2 message delivery success percentage response sensitivity 
analysis and P-values of all the factors. 
 
 C2 Message Delivery Success Percentage. Figure 40.
Based on Figure 40, we can conclude that the dropout rate message percentage 
and the networks architecture factors are statistically significant for C2 message delivery 
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success. Between those two factors, the log worth analysis shows that the C2 message 
delivery success percentage is notably more sensitive to the message dropout rate than 
the network architectures. Therefore, decreasing the number of dropped messages will 
have the biggest impact in increasing the C2 message delivery success percentage. 
2. Non-C2 Message Delivery Success 
Figure 41 shows the non-C2 message delivery success percentage response 
sensitivity analysis and P-values of all the factors. 
 
 Non-C2 Message Delivery Success Percentage. Figure 41.
Based on Figure 41, we can conclude that the dropout rate message percentage is 
the only statistically significant factor for non-C2 message delivery success. The log 
worth analysis shows that the non-C2 message delivery success percentage is sensitive to 
the message dropout rate. Therefore, decreasing the number of dropped messages will 
have the biggest impact in increasing the non-C2 message delivery success percentage. 
3. C2 Message Delivery Time 
Figure 42 shows the C2 message delivery time response sensitivity analysis and 
P-values of all the factors. 
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 C2 Message Delivery Time. Figure 42.
Based on Figure 42, we can conclude that the time to process C2 messages in the 
AFP and the time to transmit C2 messages are statistically significant factors for C2 
message delivery time. Between those two factors, the log worth analysis shows that the 
C2 message delivery time is notably more sensitive to the time to process C2 messages 
than the time to transmit C2 messages. Therefore, decreasing the time to process C2 
messages in the AFP will have the biggest impact in decreasing the C2 message delivery 
time. 
4. Non-C2 Message Delivery Time 
Figure 43 shows the non-C2 message delivery time response sensitivity analysis 
and P-values of all the factors. 
 
 Non-C2 Message Delivery Time. Figure 43.
Based on Figure 43, we can conclude that the time to process non-C2 messages in 
the AFP and the time to transmit non-C2 messages are statistically significant factors for 
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non-C2 message delivery time. Between those two factors, the log worth analysis shows 
that the non-C2 message delivery time is equally sensitive to the time to process non-C2 
messages and the time to transmit non-C2 messages. Therefore, decreasing the time to 
process non-C2 messages and the time to transmit non-C2 messages will have the biggest 
impact in decreasing the non-C2 message delivery time. 
5. Time from Request to Engagement 
Figure 44 shows the time from request to engagement response sensitivity 
analysis and P-values of all the factors. 
 
 Time from Request to Engagement. Figure 44.
Based on Figure 44, we can conclude multiple factors are statistically significant 
for time from request to engagement. Between these factors, the log worth analysis shows 
that the time from request to engagement is most sensitive to the C2 processing time at 
HHQ and the AFP. Therefore, decreasing the time it takes commanders and HHQ to 
process C2 messages will have the biggest impact in decreasing the time from request to 
engagement. 
D. MODEL VERIFICATION 
Model performance is verified by comparing the results of the test cases to 
expected results based on back of the envelope (BOE) calculations. The back of the 
envelope equations for the three networks are derived as followed: 
 2 2 ( 1) 2
1 4
(1 ) (1 ) *(1 )
5 5
Nodes
DistributedMSP MDR MDR MDR
       (1) 
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 2 2 ( 3) 2
1 4
(1 ) (1 ) *(1 )
5 5
Nodes
DecentralizedMSP MDR MDR MDR
       (2) 
 2 4
1 4
(1 ) (1 )
5 5Centralized
MSP MDR MDR      (3) 






     (4) 
where MSP is the message success percentage, MDR is the message dropout rate, and 
nodes are the number of nodes in the AFP. For the analysis, the number of nodes is five. 
The back of the envelope calculations are compared to the model results in Table 16. 
Table 16. Model Validation 
 MSPBOE | MSPModel
MDR Distributed Decentralized Centralized Distributed, No HHQ 
0.1 81% 80% 80% 79% 69% 69% 98% 99% 
0.2 63% 61% 60% 55% 45% 45% 94% 95% 
0.5 22% 15% 16% 13% 10% 10% 65% 61% 
 
The table shows the model results are consistent with the BOE calculations. The 
reason the model MSP is lower at a high MDR is because the BOE does not account for 
instances where messages are lost during transmission to the C2 forwarder and the other 
platforms simultaneously. This event would be rare at a low MDR but it would be more 








The geographical dispersion of naval forces operating under the distributed 
lethality concept introduces operational challenges to traditional C2 across an AFP due to 
the long distances required for communications, the anticipated disruption of satellite 
communications, and the relatively close proximity of opposing forces. Tactical C2 
systems must be flexible to support changing communication architectures. Operational 
C2 must be flexible to work within the boundaries of the available communication 
architectures. This research project employs MBSE methods to better understand and 
improve the capability of naval forces operating under the distributed lethality concept. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
C2 Network Architecture: The use of MBSE and statistical analysis of computer 
simulation of C2 network architectures confirms the hypothesis that a distributed mesh 
architecture is the most robust for distributed lethality C2 networks. 
C2 Process Model: Model based systems engineering identifies possible 
efficiencies to the traditional C2 process model that can improve the effectiveness of C2 
when operating within the constraints of distributed lethality. Statistical analysis of 
computer simulation of C2 networks and process models confirms the benefit. 
Advanced Tactical Data Links: Review of available and near future advanced 
tactical data links finds no 100% solution in a single system. Additionally, the distributed 
lethality AFP needs multiple tactical data link options to build a distributed mesh network 
architecture. The need for interoperability among all AFP platforms requires common 
data links. USN, USNS, joint, and coalition forces will potentially participate in 
distributed lethality operations as part of an AFP. 
Platforms without common datalinks must be modified to add this capability if 
they are to participate in the AFP C2 network. Advanced tactical data links must be 
interoperable on Link 16 and Link 22 to meet the joint and coalition interoperability 
requirement. AFP C2 systems should include provisions for the joint range extension 
protocol (JREAP) for use when IP networks or satellite communications are available. 
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Distributed lethality AFP platforms will benefit from technology updates that 
improve automated network discovery by: 
 adding a link monitoring and management tool to identify and correct 
disruptions in tactical data link networks 
 utilizing an external time reference to aid tactical data link network 
synchronization 
 employing smart command and control processor data routing to optimize 
routing and eliminate redundant messages 
Distributed lethality AFP platforms will also improve C2 network operations by 
adding directional antenna systems to the tactical data link systems. Directional antennas 
will shift from omnidirectional radio frequency radiation patterns to a controlled narrow 
beam path directed to other participants of the AFP C2 network. Benefits of directional 
antennas include lower probability of detection of the radiated signal, adding nulling 
patterns to reduce spectrum interference from hostile sources, and lower power output 
requirements for transmitters because a directional antenna focuses the RF signal using 
fewer radiating elements than an omnidirectional antenna. 
C2 Concepts: Functional analysis supporting distributed lethality C2 use systems 
architecture to evaluate different C2 concepts for an AFP. The architecture is driven by 
Naval Postgraduate School wargame scenarios based upon real world environments. The 
system of system architecture model provides a structure for simulating C2 decisions and 
evaluating if changes will provide a method for improvements. 
Model based systems engineering captures C2 sub-functions and architecture, 
separates them from the OPORD, and allocates distributed lethality requirements into C2 
as sub-functions. This approach allows OPORD evaluation as a distinct portion of the 
physical architecture, and further enables evaluation of the C2 structure by simulation of 
the kill chain. Computer model simulations focus on internal communication and external 
communication components of the distributed lethality C2 architecture, as well as the 
presence or absence of an OPORD, and the impacts to the overall mission execution as 
specific measures of effectiveness are modified. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Independent Review of Results: Obtain an independent review of the models and 
architectures to confirm model validity and analysis results. Distributed lethality models 
are evolving as the concept matures. An independent review may validate the C2 network 
models or yield recommendations to modify the models and architectures for better 
alignment with distributed lethality concepts. 
Model Additional Wargame Scenarios: Examine the effectiveness of the 
recommended OPORD and networking changes across other scenarios and AFP 
compositions from the cited wargame studies. The analysis may identify scenarios where 
the recommend changes for distributed lethality OPORD and C2 networking is not 
effective or, may actually reduce operational effectiveness. Understanding the limitations 
of distributed lethality may be as important to the Navy as understanding its benefits. 
Higher Fidelity Modeling and Simulation: Time constraints and public 
releasability of this research did not permit hi-fidelity modeling of tactical datalinks. 
Further development of scenarios utilizing autonomous aerial, surface, and subsurface 
vehicles operating as communications relays and sensors within the AFP could provide 
additional benefits. Additional modeling and simulation incorporating higher fidelity of 
communications systems and sensors will advance the distributed lethality concept and 
improve operational effectiveness. 
C. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
Additional research, beyond the scope of this study, is recommended for 
directional smart antenna controllers to reduce the probably of detection due to the 
omnidirectional nature of legacy C2 waveforms (Northrop Grumman 2016). The C2 
waveform should only transmit to other units within the AFP with a directional BLOS/
LOS waveform to reduce the probably of detection. 
As the largest simulated impact to the measure of effectiveness was shown to be 
the functionality of the OPORD at the AFP commander level, it is proposed that further 
research is warranted in the construction of an updated OPORD specifically for 
distributed lethality C2 architectures. 
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This paper establishes a basis for C2 MBSE modeling and simulation. Further 





APPENDIX A. SIMULATION RESULTS 
Table A-1 Test Case 1 Data 
 
 
Run C2 Success Perc Non C2 Success Perc C2 Mean Deliv Non C2 Mean Deliv RQT2ENG
1 81.7% 90.0% 128.0 0.200 1249.6
2 80.5% 89.8% 131.6 0.200 1269.7
3 80.4% 89.8% 131.4 0.200 1258.0
4 80.7% 90.1% 131.5 0.200 1257.9
5 79.3% 89.9% 130.9 0.200 1270.2
6 78.0% 90.0% 131.2 0.200 1274.5
7 81.4% 90.0% 130.2 0.200 1256.6
8 80.8% 90.1% 130.8 0.200 1259.2
9 80.9% 89.9% 131.7 0.200 1259.6
10 80.3% 90.0% 131.1 0.200 1259.3
Run C2 Success Perc Non C2 Success Perc C2 Mean Deliv Non C2 Mean Deliv RQT2ENG
1 79.9% 89.8% 128.7 0.200 1279.5
2 78.9% 90.0% 130.3 0.200 1284.3
3 79.7% 90.0% 131.5 0.200 1272.2
4 77.9% 90.1% 130.0 0.200 1262.4
5 78.9% 90.1% 128.9 0.200 1253.3
6 77.7% 90.1% 130.5 0.200 1277.9
7 79.1% 89.9% 130.9 0.200 1289.4
8 79.2% 90.0% 129.9 0.200 1285.3
9 79.0% 90.2% 129.0 0.200 1272.6
10 78.5% 90.2% 130.2 0.200 1275.2
Run C2 Success Perc Non C2 Success Perc C2 Mean Deliv Non C2 Mean Deliv RQT2ENG
1 66.2% 89.9% 129.3 0.200 1280.8
2 68.6% 89.9% 129.6 0.200 1283.4
3 68.8% 90.1% 130.4 0.200 1284.2
4 66.7% 90.2% 132.1 0.200 1291.0
5 68.7% 90.3% 130.1 0.200 1313.5
6 68.7% 90.2% 129.0 0.200 1287.3
7 67.3% 90.0% 131.1 0.200 1287.3
8 69.9% 90.3% 130.4 0.200 1284.2
9 66.9% 89.9% 129.0 0.200 1282.6





Table A-2 Test Case 2 Data 
 
Run C2 Success Perc Non C2 Success Perc C2 Mean Deliv Non C2 Mean Deliv RQT2ENG
1 78.9% 89.9% 130.3 0.200 1258.1
2 81.3% 90.1% 131.0 0.200 1268.3
3 80.2% 90.1% 130.5 0.200 1266.5
4 80.7% 90.0% 130.5 0.200 1275.9
5 80.7% 90.1% 128.7 0.200 1248.6
6 81.9% 90.1% 128.2 0.200 1258.9
7 79.5% 89.9% 129.1 0.200 1246.0
8 81.5% 90.0% 130.4 0.200 1258.1
9 80.3% 89.9% 130.7 0.200 1261.9
10 82.6% 90.0% 131.5 0.200 1256.5
Run C2 Success Perc Non C2 Success Perc C2 Mean Deliv Non C2 Mean Deliv RQT2ENG
1 82.5% 90.0% 127.6 0.200 1263.8
2 77.7% 89.8% 131.8 0.200 1269.8
3 81.3% 90.1% 127.8 0.200 1251.7
4 80.9% 90.0% 131.2 0.200 1265.5
5 81.0% 89.9% 130.1 0.200 1253.2
6 81.1% 89.9% 130.3 0.200 1266.9
7 79.2% 89.8% 132.4 0.200 1267.9
8 79.4% 89.9% 131.0 0.200 1266.9
9 81.2% 90.1% 132.6 0.200 1269.2
10 80.4% 90.0% 130.7 0.200 1245.5
Run C2 Success Perc Non C2 Success Perc C2 Mean Deliv Non C2 Mean Deliv RQT2ENG
1 80.6% 90.0% 131.5 0.200 1276.4
2 80.3% 90.1% 130.5 0.200 1260.7
3 80.8% 90.1% 129.6 0.200 1260.0
4 82.0% 90.0% 129.9 0.200 1265.6
5 79.3% 89.8% 128.7 0.200 1252.6
6 79.7% 90.0% 129.8 0.200 1254.7
7 79.9% 90.1% 130.8 0.200 1258.6
8 78.9% 89.9% 129.6 0.200 1269.2
9 81.3% 90.0% 130.1 0.200 1261.5
10 79.6% 90.0% 129.5 0.200 1255.6
Run C2 Success Perc Non C2 Success Perc C2 Mean Deliv Non C2 Mean Deliv RQT2ENG
1 81.7% 90.0% 128.0 0.200 1249.6
2 80.5% 89.8% 131.6 0.200 1269.7
3 80.4% 89.8% 131.4 0.200 1258.0
4 80.7% 90.1% 131.5 0.200 1257.9
5 79.3% 89.9% 130.9 0.200 1270.2
6 78.0% 90.0% 131.2 0.200 1274.5
7 81.4% 90.0% 130.2 0.200 1256.6
8 80.8% 90.1% 130.8 0.200 1259.2
9 80.9% 89.9% 131.7 0.200 1259.6
10 80.3% 90.0% 131.1 0.200 1259.3
Run C2 Success Perc Non C2 Success Perc C2 Mean Deliv Non C2 Mean Deliv RQT2ENG
1 79.8% 90.1% 130.0 0.200 1252.1
2 79.6% 90.0% 132.0 0.200 1264.9
3 81.2% 90.0% 128.8 0.200 1262.5
4 79.9% 90.0% 129.2 0.200 1259.0
5 79.9% 90.0% 130.2 0.200 1242.0
6 80.3% 90.0% 129.8 0.200 1263.0
7 80.2% 89.9% 130.5 0.200 1273.7
8 81.0% 89.9% 130.3 0.200 1257.3
9 80.0% 90.0% 130.7 0.200 1255.4







Table A-3 Test Case 3 Data 
 
 
Message Dropout Rate Distributed C2 Success Centralized C2 Success Decentralized C2 Success
2.0% 95.3% 93.0% 96.7%
2.7% 94.3% 90.9% 94.6%
2.9% 93.4% 90.5% 94.7%
3.2% 94.4% 89.4% 93.4%
3.9% 92.6% 86.9% 92.2%
8.8% 83.1% 70.8% 80.1%
11.2% 77.9% 64.3% 76.8%
15.2% 69.2% 55.3% 67.0%
16.4% 68.0% 53.5% 64.2%
22.2% 56.7% 40.6% 50.2%
24.5% 52.5% 37.0% 48.6%
26.0% 48.4% 35.6% 44.4%
26.8% 47.7% 35.3% 44.9%
29.4% 44.5% 30.5% 38.1%
33.2% 39.5% 24.0% 33.9%
38.5% 28.2% 18.8% 26.0%
42.1% 25.3% 15.7% 21.1%
42.1% 25.0% 14.6% 19.6%
44.9% 20.9% 13.5% 17.8%
45.6% 20.4% 12.5% 16.7%
45.8% 21.4% 13.5% 15.9%
47.8% 18.5% 11.2% 15.8%
48.7% 15.4% 11.3% 14.4%
54.2% 12.0% 6.7% 9.0%
54.4% 12.0% 7.9% 8.9%
56.5% 9.3% 6.8% 7.8%
62.1% 5.9% 4.8% 4.9%
63.0% 5.0% 3.6% 5.0%
63.1% 5.1% 4.0% 5.1%
64.1% 5.5% 3.6% 3.7%
64.5% 6.0% 3.9% 4.0%
67.3% 3.5% 2.6% 3.9%
69.0% 3.7% 2.8% 2.9%
70.5% 2.8% 2.4% 1.9%
70.8% 2.2% 2.4% 2.4%
71.4% 2.4% 1.5% 2.9%
76.5% 1.3% 1.1% 1.2%
77.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.3%
77.6% 1.4% 1.2% 1.0%
80.4% 0.8% 1.0% 0.5%
80.9% 0.7% 1.1% 1.0%
81.9% 0.8% 1.2% 0.8%
83.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6%
85.9% 0.6% 0.5% 0.2%
91.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
91.9% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
92.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
93.8% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1%
96.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
98.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
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Table A-4 Test Case 4 Data 
 
 
Run C2 Success Perc Non C2 Success Perc C2 Mean Deliv Non C2 Mean Deliv RQT2ENG
1 81.7% 90.0% 128.0 0.200 1249.6
2 80.5% 89.8% 131.6 0.200 1269.7
3 80.4% 89.8% 131.4 0.200 1258.0
4 80.7% 90.1% 131.5 0.200 1257.9
5 79.3% 89.9% 130.9 0.200 1270.2
6 78.0% 90.0% 131.2 0.200 1274.5
7 81.4% 90.0% 130.2 0.200 1256.6
8 80.8% 90.1% 130.8 0.200 1259.2
9 80.9% 89.9% 131.7 0.200 1259.6
10 80.3% 90.0% 131.1 0.200 1259.3
Run C2 Success Perc Non C2 Success Perc C2 Mean Deliv Non C2 Mean Deliv RQT2ENG
1 99.5% 90.1% 132.6 0.200 263.1
2 99.3% 89.9% 128.5 0.200 259.2
3 99.0% 90.0% 132.6 0.200 262.1
4 99.4% 89.9% 129.1 0.200 258.4
5 99.3% 89.9% 129.2 0.200 259.6
6 99.5% 90.0% 130.3 0.200 259.2
7 99.3% 90.1% 131.0 0.200 261.1
8 99.3% 90.0% 131.0 0.200 259.8
9 99.2% 90.0% 129.9 0.200 259.0























































Table A-5 Design of Experiment Data 
 
 
Run  TX nonC2 TX C2 Processnon C2 Process C2 AFP Process C2 HHQ Network Dropped MSG C2 Success percentange NonC2 success percentage C2 delivery time Non‐C2 delivery time Time from RQT to ENG
1 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.1 79.2% 90.1% 112.8 0.200 1028.3
2 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.35 35.6% 65.1% 112.5 0.200 1067.0
3 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.6 7.4% 39.9% 114.7 0.200 1012.1
4 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.1 69.3% 89.9% 114.8 0.200 1054.8
5 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.35 22.4% 64.9% 107.8 0.200 1075.7
6 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.6 4.9% 40.1% 116.3 0.200 1149.8
7 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.1 79.5% 89.9% 116.0 0.200 1056.4
8 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.35 31.5% 65.2% 113.3 0.200 1046.4
9 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.6 7.4% 40.2% 116.7 0.200 1072.0
10 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.1 81.3% 90.1% 114.1 0.200 1529.7
11 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.35 36.0% 64.7% 118.0 0.200 1532.5
12 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.6 7.4% 40.0% 113.8 0.200 1522.7
13 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.1 69.9% 89.7% 114.2 0.200 1560.4
14 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.35 23.3% 65.0% 115.1 0.200 1553.1
15 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.6 4.6% 40.3% 113.8 0.200 1601.7
16 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.1 78.3% 90.0% 114.1 0.200 1540.4
17 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.35 28.7% 64.9% 118.6 0.200 1542.1
18 0.1 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.6 5.7% 40.1% 115.1 0.200 1534.1
19 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.1 79.7% 90.0% 179.5 0.200 1169.8
20 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.35 34.3% 65.0% 176.0 0.200 1186.3
21 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.6 8.2% 40.1% 174.1 0.200 1251.0
22 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 300 Centralized 0.1 68.9% 90.1% 177.4 0.200 1211.0
23 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 300 Centralized 0.35 22.3% 64.9% 174.7 0.200 1224.6
24 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 300 Centralized 0.6 5.2% 40.1% 189.2 0.200 1247.1
25 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.1 79.3% 90.0% 176.4 0.200 1166.5
26 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.35 31.3% 64.9% 178.0 0.200 1200.6
27 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.6 6.3% 39.8% 173.8 0.200 1158.9
28 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.1 80.9% 90.1% 179.0 0.200 1649.2
29 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.35 35.8% 65.2% 178.0 0.200 1701.2
30 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.6 6.2% 40.0% 179.1 0.200 1664.6
31 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.1 70.9% 89.9% 177.4 0.200 1691.7
32 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.35 25.1% 65.1% 177.2 0.200 1689.2
33 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.6 6.0% 40.0% 181.1 0.200 1741.7
34 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.1 79.0% 89.9% 176.8 0.200 1684.5
35 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.35 31.4% 65.1% 178.4 0.200 1704.4
36 0.1 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.6 6.6% 40.1% 180.1 0.200 1665.6
37 0.1 1.5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.1 81.3% 90.1% 112.6 2.100 1023.2
38 0.1 1.5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.35 34.3% 65.0% 117.6 2.100 1061.0
39 0.1 1.5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.6 6.2% 40.0% 109.2 2.100 1118.5
40 0.1 1.5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.1 69.4% 90.1% 113.7 2.100 1064.2
41 0.1 1.5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.35 21.0% 65.3% 110.2 2.100 1064.2
42 0.1 1.5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.6 6.1% 39.9% 115.4 2.100 1081.8
43 0.1 1.5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.1 79.0% 90.2% 117.5 2.100 1040.8
44 0.1 1.5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.35 28.7% 65.1% 117.4 2.100 1057.2
45 0.1 1.5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.6 7.3% 39.9% 116.1 2.100 1053.5
46 0.1 1.5 2 60 1800 Distributed 0.1 79.2% 90.0% 116.1 2.100 1509.9
47 0.1 1.5 2 60 1800 Distributed 0.35 34.1% 65.2% 113.4 2.100 1525.0
48 0.1 1.5 2 60 1800 Distributed 0.6 7.3% 40.1% 112.1 2.100 1612.8
49 0.1 1.5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.1 68.2% 90.0% 116.4 2.100 1561.9
50 0.1 1.5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.35 23.2% 64.8% 110.7 2.100 1542.8
51 0.1 1.5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.6 4.6% 40.3% 118.4 2.100 1467.4
52 0.1 1.5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.1 79.7% 90.0% 113.8 2.100 1544.7
53 0.1 1.5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.35 31.6% 65.0% 113.3 2.100 1585.3
54 0.1 1.5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.6 6.3% 40.1% 112.2 2.100 1485.4
55 0.1 1.5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.1 81.4% 90.0% 179.8 2.100 1159.1
56 0.1 1.5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.35 34.7% 64.8% 178.2 2.100 1190.2
57 0.1 1.5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.6 7.3% 40.2% 177.6 2.100 1204.0
58 0.1 1.5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.1 67.6% 90.0% 179.1 2.100 1211.1
59 0.1 1.5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.35 23.9% 65.0% 178.6 2.100 1188.9
60 0.1 1.5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.6 6.0% 40.3% 178.7 2.100 1300.5
61 0.1 1.5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.1 77.5% 89.9% 177.8 2.100 1194.6
62 0.1 1.5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.35 29.9% 64.9% 178.2 2.100 1165.4
63 0.1 1.5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.6 7.3% 39.8% 186.6 2.100 1210.1
64 0.1 1.5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.1 80.1% 90.1% 176.8 2.100 1657.2
65 0.1 1.5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.35 34.7% 65.2% 177.9 2.100 1696.9
66 0.1 1.5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.6 6.3% 39.8% 174.5 2.100 1710.0
67 0.1 1.5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.1 69.2% 89.8% 177.3 2.100 1704.0
68 0.1 1.5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.35 24.5% 65.1% 180.2 2.100 1712.5
69 0.1 1.5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.6 6.0% 40.1% 170.4 2.100 1673.7
70 0.1 1.5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.1 77.4% 90.0% 177.4 2.100 1687.2
71 0.1 1.5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.35 28.3% 65.0% 177.6 2.100 1693.4
72 0.1 1.5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.6 4.8% 39.6% 183.6 2.100 1661.9
73 0.1 5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.1 81.1% 89.9% 117.5 0.200 1043.0
74 0.1 5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.35 34.0% 64.9% 118.6 0.200 1046.1
75 0.1 5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.6 7.4% 39.9% 111.6 0.200 1039.4
76 0.1 5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.1 67.6% 90.1% 118.7 0.200 1076.4
77 0.1 5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.35 20.8% 65.2% 121.6 0.200 1050.6
78 0.1 5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.6 4.8% 39.9% 121.6 0.200 1139.3
79 0.1 5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.1 77.9% 90.1% 120.9 0.200 1039.8
80 0.1 5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.35 28.9% 65.0% 121.1 0.200 1063.6
81 0.1 5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.6 6.1% 39.8% 125.6 0.200 1054.7
82 0.1 5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.1 81.4% 90.1% 118.5 0.200 1549.8
83 0.1 5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.35 34.3% 65.2% 118.1 0.200 1538.8
84 0.1 5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.6 5.7% 39.9% 113.9 0.200 1575.6
85 0.1 5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.1 68.6% 90.0% 117.5 0.200 1585.3
86 0.1 5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.35 22.3% 64.9% 122.5 0.200 1557.2
87 0.1 5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.6 5.3% 39.7% 122.8 0.200 1600.2
88 0.1 5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.1 78.4% 90.0% 117.5 0.200 1552.5
89 0.1 5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.35 31.0% 65.2% 119.9 0.200 1567.2
90 0.1 5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.6 5.7% 40.1% 113.5 0.200 1615.6
91 0.1 5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.1 79.8% 90.0% 183.0 0.200 1185.2
92 0.1 5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.35 35.0% 64.9% 189.1 0.200 1220.3
93 0.1 5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.6 8.5% 40.1% 181.4 0.200 1234.3
94 0.1 5 0.1 300 300 Centralized 0.1 66.8% 90.0% 184.2 0.200 1233.0
95 0.1 5 0.1 300 300 Centralized 0.35 23.2% 64.9% 187.1 0.200 1223.8




97 0.1 5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.1 79.2% 90.0% 182.0 0.200 1199.0
98 0.1 5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.35 30.8% 65.0% 180.1 0.200 1173.4
99 0.1 5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.6 7.0% 40.0% 181.1 0.200 1157.9
100 0.1 5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.1 80.7% 90.1% 184.1 0.200 1666.3
101 0.1 5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.35 35.5% 65.1% 184.6 0.200 1698.4
102 0.1 5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.6 7.8% 40.0% 185.9 0.200 1781.0
103 0.1 5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.1 68.9% 89.9% 180.5 0.200 1719.9
104 0.1 5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.35 22.9% 64.8% 184.2 0.200 1679.0
105 0.1 5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.6 5.6% 39.9% 186.9 0.200 1669.7
106 0.1 5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.1 79.1% 90.0% 183.0 0.200 1695.9
107 0.1 5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.35 31.4% 64.8% 183.3 0.200 1733.3
108 0.1 5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.6 5.8% 40.1% 181.8 0.200 1709.6
109 0.1 5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.1 79.0% 90.0% 118.8 2.100 1014.7
110 0.1 5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.35 37.0% 65.1% 118.8 2.100 1041.7
111 0.1 5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.6 7.6% 40.0% 128.1 2.100 1117.8
112 0.1 5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.1 66.5% 90.3% 119.2 2.100 1058.7
113 0.1 5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.35 23.3% 65.1% 120.3 2.100 1093.5
114 0.1 5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.6 5.8% 39.9% 125.4 2.100 1033.1
115 0.1 5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.1 79.3% 90.0% 118.9 2.100 1070.0
116 0.1 5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.35 28.4% 65.1% 120.0 2.100 1072.1
117 0.1 5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.6 6.5% 40.2% 114.7 2.100 1051.8
118 0.1 5 2 60 1800 Distributed 0.1 82.4% 90.0% 118.8 2.100 1541.4
119 0.1 5 2 60 1800 Distributed 0.35 33.3% 65.1% 119.8 2.100 1571.7
120 0.1 5 2 60 1800 Distributed 0.6 6.9% 40.0% 110.9 2.100 1524.0
121 0.1 5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.1 69.4% 90.0% 121.3 2.100 1583.1
122 0.1 5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.35 21.1% 65.0% 120.5 2.100 1560.4
123 0.1 5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.6 5.1% 39.8% 110.8 2.100 1555.1
124 0.1 5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.1 77.5% 90.0% 119.6 2.100 1553.7
125 0.1 5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.35 29.3% 65.0% 120.9 2.100 1546.2
126 0.1 5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.6 6.4% 40.1% 118.8 2.100 1575.9
127 0.1 5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.1 80.1% 90.1% 184.1 2.100 1175.2
128 0.1 5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.35 33.7% 65.2% 183.7 2.100 1174.6
129 0.1 5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.6 7.7% 40.0% 184.3 2.100 1180.1
130 0.1 5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.1 67.9% 90.0% 180.0 2.100 1206.6
131 0.1 5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.35 24.0% 64.9% 183.0 2.100 1209.0
132 0.1 5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.6 5.4% 40.0% 190.0 2.100 1191.1
133 0.1 5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.1 78.6% 90.0% 184.6 2.100 1200.9
134 0.1 5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.35 29.6% 64.9% 183.6 2.100 1198.2
135 0.1 5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.6 6.9% 39.9% 178.0 2.100 1148.7
136 0.1 5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.1 80.4% 90.1% 181.0 2.100 1648.8
137 0.1 5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.35 36.1% 65.1% 184.7 2.100 1692.3
138 0.1 5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.6 7.6% 40.3% 180.9 2.100 1695.7
139 0.1 5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.1 66.8% 89.9% 182.4 2.100 1723.8
140 0.1 5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.35 22.5% 64.7% 184.4 2.100 1716.8
141 0.1 5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.6 6.2% 39.8% 183.1 2.100 1789.4
142 0.1 5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.1 78.9% 89.9% 183.2 2.100 1695.9
143 0.1 5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.35 31.5% 64.9% 181.5 2.100 1701.0
144 0.1 5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.6 6.4% 40.1% 178.4 2.100 1706.3
145 2 1.5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.1 80.7% 90.0% 113.5 2.100 1040.5
146 2 1.5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.35 36.3% 65.0% 114.4 2.100 1053.0
147 2 1.5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.6 5.9% 40.1% 110.7 2.100 1026.4
148 2 1.5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.1 68.0% 89.8% 112.0 2.100 1043.0
149 2 1.5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.35 22.1% 65.1% 117.1 2.100 1077.0
150 2 1.5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.6 6.1% 40.2% 126.0 2.100 1066.6
151 2 1.5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.1 78.7% 90.1% 115.7 2.100 1038.2
152 2 1.5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.35 29.6% 65.2% 116.1 2.100 1063.9
153 2 1.5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.6 6.4% 40.0% 115.7 2.100 1000.1
154 2 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.1 79.7% 89.9% 115.1 2.100 1530.3
155 2 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.35 37.2% 64.8% 114.3 2.100 1541.1
156 2 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.6 8.3% 40.2% 119.2 2.100 1545.9
157 2 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.1 68.9% 90.0% 112.1 2.100 1550.8
158 2 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.35 21.0% 65.1% 110.5 2.100 1562.5
159 2 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.6 4.8% 39.9% 119.4 2.100 1564.6
160 2 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.1 78.0% 90.0% 114.2 2.100 1526.1
161 2 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.35 29.6% 65.2% 119.4 2.100 1564.5
162 2 1.5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.6 6.6% 39.9% 115.2 2.100 1561.0
163 2 1.5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.1 82.5% 90.0% 177.6 2.100 1164.4
164 2 1.5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.35 35.1% 64.9% 177.1 2.100 1198.3
165 2 1.5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.6 8.0% 40.1% 174.4 2.100 1172.1
166 2 1.5 0.1 300 300 Centralized 0.1 69.2% 89.9% 176.2 2.100 1214.2
167 2 1.5 0.1 300 300 Centralized 0.35 23.8% 65.0% 178.5 2.100 1238.2
168 2 1.5 0.1 300 300 Centralized 0.6 3.8% 40.0% 188.8 2.100 1194.5
169 2 1.5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.1 76.9% 89.9% 178.6 2.100 1178.7
170 2 1.5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.35 31.7% 65.0% 179.6 2.100 1204.4
171 2 1.5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.6 5.5% 39.9% 172.9 2.100 1285.0
172 2 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.1 80.0% 89.9% 178.4 2.100 1657.7
173 2 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.35 34.9% 65.1% 178.1 2.100 1700.1
174 2 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.6 7.9% 40.1% 177.1 2.100 1719.4
175 2 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.1 68.4% 90.0% 178.5 2.100 1700.6
176 2 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.35 23.0% 65.0% 175.0 2.100 1719.2
177 2 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.6 5.5% 39.9% 174.4 2.100 1734.9
178 2 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.1 78.8% 90.1% 177.4 2.100 1679.1
179 2 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.35 28.0% 65.0% 179.3 2.100 1678.2
180 2 1.5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.6 5.9% 40.1% 181.7 2.100 1677.0
181 2 1.5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.1 81.0% 89.9% 115.2 4.000 1017.4
182 2 1.5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.35 33.9% 65.0% 115.7 4.000 1030.1
183 2 1.5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.6 7.0% 39.8% 116.9 4.000 1025.9
184 2 1.5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.1 69.3% 90.2% 113.8 4.000 1063.8
185 2 1.5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.35 22.8% 65.0% 114.3 4.000 1032.2
186 2 1.5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.6 5.1% 39.6% 114.5 4.000 1120.5
187 2 1.5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.1 80.9% 90.0% 112.4 4.000 1033.6
188 2 1.5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.35 30.6% 65.2% 114.3 4.000 1064.9
189 2 1.5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.6 5.9% 39.9% 106.0 4.000 990.8
190 2 1.5 2 60 1800 Distributed 0.1 79.3% 90.1% 113.6 4.000 1514.8
191 2 1.5 2 60 1800 Distributed 0.35 36.8% 65.0% 114.7 4.000 1542.7




193 2 1.5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.1 69.5% 89.9% 114.2 4.000 1542.6
194 2 1.5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.35 24.0% 65.0% 114.6 4.000 1557.1
195 2 1.5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.6 5.4% 40.2% 120.2 4.000 1562.4
196 2 1.5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.1 78.7% 89.9% 115.0 4.000 1555.3
197 2 1.5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.35 29.3% 65.1% 113.6 4.000 1530.2
198 2 1.5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.6 7.3% 39.8% 113.5 4.000 1566.8
199 2 1.5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.1 80.4% 89.9% 178.0 4.000 1156.5
200 2 1.5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.35 34.7% 64.9% 175.4 4.000 1169.8
201 2 1.5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.6 7.0% 39.8% 176.8 4.000 1219.6
202 2 1.5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.1 69.3% 90.0% 175.6 4.000 1189.4
203 2 1.5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.35 23.1% 64.7% 180.4 4.000 1202.1
204 2 1.5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.6 5.3% 40.2% 173.3 4.000 1150.0
205 2 1.5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.1 78.2% 90.0% 177.7 4.000 1181.4
206 2 1.5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.35 31.5% 65.0% 180.1 4.000 1181.7
207 2 1.5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.6 5.9% 40.0% 182.0 4.000 1142.2
208 2 1.5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.1 79.7% 90.0% 178.7 4.000 1662.9
209 2 1.5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.35 34.6% 64.9% 181.5 4.000 1695.5
210 2 1.5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.6 6.8% 40.2% 187.4 4.000 1666.1
211 2 1.5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.1 69.8% 90.2% 176.5 4.000 1693.4
212 2 1.5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.35 23.0% 65.0% 176.6 4.000 1701.7
213 2 1.5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.6 4.7% 40.0% 169.3 4.000 1732.2
214 2 1.5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.1 79.8% 90.1% 179.0 4.000 1690.0
215 2 1.5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.35 28.9% 65.0% 176.3 4.000 1683.4
216 2 1.5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.6 6.7% 40.1% 176.2 4.000 1722.1
217 2 5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.1 80.8% 90.2% 114.5 2.100 1003.7
218 2 5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.35 35.0% 64.8% 114.1 2.100 1040.3
219 2 5 0.1 60 300 Distributed 0.6 6.9% 39.8% 115.8 2.100 1036.0
220 2 5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.1 67.7% 90.0% 119.1 2.100 1072.1
221 2 5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.35 23.6% 65.0% 116.6 2.100 1064.8
222 2 5 0.1 60 300 Centralized 0.6 4.7% 39.7% 129.5 2.100 1120.7
223 2 5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.1 78.1% 90.0% 120.2 2.100 1056.5
224 2 5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.35 30.3% 65.2% 117.7 2.100 1055.6
225 2 5 0.1 60 300 Decentralized 0.6 6.5% 40.0% 119.8 2.100 1074.8
226 2 5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.1 79.6% 90.0% 117.6 2.100 1549.2
227 2 5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.35 34.0% 64.9% 118.3 2.100 1570.2
228 2 5 0.1 60 1800 Distributed 0.6 7.6% 40.1% 122.6 2.100 1609.8
229 2 5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.1 69.9% 90.2% 118.6 2.100 1573.7
230 2 5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.35 24.4% 65.4% 114.3 2.100 1538.7
231 2 5 0.1 60 1800 Centralized 0.6 6.5% 39.9% 110.6 2.100 1609.7
232 2 5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.1 76.5% 90.3% 118.7 2.100 1555.7
233 2 5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.35 29.7% 64.7% 116.9 2.100 1533.0
234 2 5 0.1 60 1800 Decentralized 0.6 6.5% 40.1% 119.3 2.100 1582.1
235 2 5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.1 80.1% 90.0% 184.3 2.100 1169.5
236 2 5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.35 34.7% 64.7% 184.2 2.100 1203.3
237 2 5 0.1 300 300 Distributed 0.6 6.5% 39.8% 175.5 2.100 1122.3
238 2 5 0.1 300 300 Centralized 0.1 69.1% 90.1% 181.3 2.100 1207.9
239 2 5 0.1 300 300 Centralized 0.35 21.6% 65.2% 178.9 2.100 1171.6
240 2 5 0.1 300 300 Centralized 0.6 4.8% 40.3% 191.4 2.100 1257.4
241 2 5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.1 77.9% 89.9% 185.3 2.100 1199.3
242 2 5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.35 30.3% 65.1% 185.9 2.100 1215.0
243 2 5 0.1 300 300 Decentralized 0.6 7.1% 39.9% 183.2 2.100 1248.5
244 2 5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.1 79.3% 90.0% 182.2 2.100 1678.8
245 2 5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.35 35.3% 64.8% 185.9 2.100 1728.7
246 2 5 0.1 300 1800 Distributed 0.6 8.6% 40.1% 185.5 2.100 1737.9
247 2 5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.1 69.7% 90.1% 183.5 2.100 1712.2
248 2 5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.35 21.6% 65.0% 183.2 2.100 1711.1
249 2 5 0.1 300 1800 Centralized 0.6 5.2% 40.2% 188.6 2.100 1695.6
250 2 5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.1 77.3% 90.1% 184.4 2.100 1707.5
251 2 5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.35 31.3% 64.8% 185.3 2.100 1697.4
252 2 5 0.1 300 1800 Decentralized 0.6 6.0% 40.1% 180.9 2.100 1827.5
253 2 5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.1 79.6% 90.0% 116.6 4.000 1019.4
254 2 5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.35 33.4% 64.9% 118.7 4.000 1056.7
255 2 5 2 60 300 Distributed 0.6 7.7% 39.7% 120.9 4.000 1053.3
256 2 5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.1 67.4% 89.8% 116.9 4.000 1048.3
257 2 5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.35 22.0% 65.3% 114.6 4.000 1054.4
258 2 5 2 60 300 Centralized 0.6 4.8% 40.4% 129.6 4.000 1021.1
259 2 5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.1 78.9% 90.1% 120.4 4.000 1073.6
260 2 5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.35 31.0% 64.9% 116.4 4.000 1059.5
261 2 5 2 60 300 Decentralized 0.6 5.4% 40.0% 118.6 4.000 1044.0
262 2 5 2 60 1800 Distributed 0.1 82.0% 90.1% 119.2 4.000 1543.5
263 2 5 2 60 1800 Distributed 0.35 33.7% 65.1% 119.2 4.000 1545.2
264 2 5 2 60 1800 Distributed 0.6 7.8% 40.1% 114.2 4.000 1607.3
265 2 5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.1 69.1% 89.9% 119.9 4.000 1574.8
266 2 5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.35 24.1% 64.8% 119.1 4.000 1574.5
267 2 5 2 60 1800 Centralized 0.6 4.5% 40.0% 116.6 4.000 1574.4
268 2 5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.1 77.9% 90.2% 117.6 4.000 1566.8
269 2 5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.35 30.0% 64.9% 123.7 4.000 1562.7
270 2 5 2 60 1800 Decentralized 0.6 6.3% 39.9% 119.4 4.000 1571.7
271 2 5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.1 79.3% 90.1% 182.2 4.000 1169.1
272 2 5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.35 35.1% 65.1% 183.8 4.000 1219.3
273 2 5 2 300 300 Distributed 0.6 5.9% 39.9% 184.7 4.000 1170.7
274 2 5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.1 70.1% 90.1% 181.8 4.000 1205.3
275 2 5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.35 24.7% 64.7% 179.1 4.000 1197.7
276 2 5 2 300 300 Centralized 0.6 5.2% 40.1% 172.5 4.000 1200.2
277 2 5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.1 78.8% 90.1% 184.1 4.000 1193.9
278 2 5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.35 29.5% 64.9% 182.2 4.000 1189.6
279 2 5 2 300 300 Decentralized 0.6 6.7% 39.8% 196.2 4.000 1250.8
280 2 5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.1 79.7% 90.1% 183.4 4.000 1689.8
281 2 5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.35 33.5% 65.0% 182.8 4.000 1713.2
282 2 5 2 300 1800 Distributed 0.6 5.8% 40.1% 171.8 4.000 1724.4
283 2 5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.1 67.5% 90.0% 182.6 4.000 1732.3
284 2 5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.35 21.1% 64.8% 180.8 4.000 1710.7
285 2 5 2 300 1800 Centralized 0.6 87.5% 96.2% 184.5 4.000 1721.1
286 2 5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.1 79.2% 90.2% 182.4 4.000 1685.9
287 2 5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.35 29.4% 65.0% 185.1 4.000 1690.3
288 2 5 2 300 1800 Decentralized 0.6 6.5% 40.0% 176.2 4.000 1701.9
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APPENDIX B. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
A. DERIVED MODEL REQUIREMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Model Assumptions 
The distributed lethality C2 model attempts to operate within the following 
priorities and assumptions. Priorities and assumptions come from distributed lethality 
reference articles cited throughout this paper, stakeholder feedback during in process 
reviews, and distributed lethality-C2 team professional experience. 
1. Model for optimum offensive and defensive coverage of 1000 nmi x 500 
nmi area. 
1. Model for optimum communications range to support AFP 1 in scenario 2. 
2. Minimize hops to move information between platforms. 
3. Establish threshold and optimal requirements via models. 
4. Each node requires 2 or more communications paths (goal is to maximize 
paths and minimize hops). 
5. Each airborne relay counts as one hop. 
6. Low Probability of Detection /Low Probability of Intercept networking 
waveform desired. 
7. Waveform needs to accommodate Interoperability with USN and 
Coalition forces (Eckstein 2017). 
8. Weapons must have sensor on target to launch – aircraft are sensors (MH-
60, Fire Scout, JSF, Scan Eagle, Triton). 
2. OA4606: Wargaming Applications Source Information 
The scenario development builds upon prior distributed lethality wargame studies 
conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Operations Research Department during 
the Summer and Fall 2015 courses of “OA4604 Wargaming Applications” (Orndorff et 
al. 2015). Assumptions for the scenario and model development build upon a paper, 
“SUBJECT: Distributed Lethality Wargame Results” (DL_Final_Report.v4.docx) and a 
presentation, “Sponsor Brief and Final Report Distributed Lethality Phase 0 - 1 
WARGAME” (DLWargamingFinalBrief.v4.pptx), dated 14 December 2015. 
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3. OA4606: Wargaming Scenario 2 AFP 
 
Offensive weapons are given for platforms in the wargame scenario. AFP 1 in 
scenario 2 is chosen for model. 
a. AFP 1 
 3xLCS w/120NM Offensive Anti-Surface Weapon (OASuW) 
 2xDDG 51s w/TLAM – Equipped with notional surface warfare capable 
seeker 
b. AFP 2 
 1xLHA equipped w/F-35 
 3xDDG 51s w/ TLAM – Equipped with notional surface warfare capable 
seeker 
c. AFP 3 
 2xDDG 51s w/TLAM 
 12x PCG w/OASuW (8 OASuW each) 
The map in scenario 2 is chosen from the report, “Appendix 1: Scenario Maps.” 
The scenario 2 area is approximately of 900 by 550 statute miles. The size is rounded to 
1000 by 500 nmi for ease of modeling the distributed lethality C2 scenario. Curvature of 
the earth is not modeled (flat earth model used). Using the Pythagorean Theorem, 
maximum range from corner-to-corner = 1118 nmi; 1/2 maximum range 559 nmi. A 
Red Forces
1 x Carrier (with 12 x FS-7)
1 x Landing Craft AFP1 AFP2 AFP3
2 x Amphibious Vessels 3 x Littoral Combat Ship 3 x Destroyer 2 x Destroyer
5 x Destroyers 2 x Destroyer 12 x Attack Aircraft 2 x High Speed Vessel
6 x Frigate 1 x Amphibious 12 x Small Missile Craft
5 x Corvette       Landing Craft
3 x Submarine 1 x Recon Aircraft 1 x Recon Aircraft 1 x Recon Aircraft
4 x Attack Aircraft 1 x Destroyer 1 x Destroyer 1 x Destroyer
4 x Jammer Aircraft
2 x Coast Guard Cutters
2 x Coast Guard Patrol Crafts
2 x Groups of  Fisherman Boats
Scenario 2: Adaptive Force Package
Blue Forces
Choice of one Adaptive Force Package
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mathematical model was built in in Microsoft Excel to calculate coverage and placement 
using defined parameters. 
4. Platform Line of Sight Calculations 
It is assumed that communications must work continuously day and night in all 
weather and cover the distances of the scenario. Line of sight (LOS) radio frequency (RF) 
communications are limited by maximum antenna height of each surface platform 
without an airborne relay. LOS is estimated with an online tool: 
http://www.calculatoredge.com/electronics/lineofsight.htm 
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) with an estimated mast height of 100 feet yields 
14 miles to the LOS horizon. A Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) with an estimated mast 
height of 160 feet = 18 miles to horizon. A Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) with an 
estimated mast height of 200 feet = 20 miles to horizon. 
Worst-case platform to platform LOS coverage is LCS to LCS = 28 miles. Best-
case platform to platform LOS coverage is LHA to DDG = 38 miles. Airborne relay 
cannot be expected to work in all weather or have required continuous day and night 
persistence. Conclusion: BLOS or satellite communications are required to cover the 
possible scenario ranges. 
A single airborne relay at 120,000 ft provides 504 mi LOS and can cover the 
entire scenario area. An airborne relay at 41,000 ft provides 300 mi LOS coverage. 
5. Platform Model Parameters of Interest 
Parameters of interest that drove scenario and C2 communications modeling 
development are: 
 Max Offensive Anti-Surface Weapon (OASuW) 
 Max Organic Defensive Range 
 Max Organic Sensor Range 
 LOS Communication Range to horizon 
 BLOS Communication Range 
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6. Values for Platform Model Parameters 
Values given in the wargame scenario 2 (Orndorff et al. 2015) were used when 
available. Other values and ranges were derived from Jane’s Fighting Ships 2016–2017 
(IHS Global Limited 2016). 
a. DDG Platform Model (from Scenario 2) 
 Max OASuW Range = 900+ nmi (TLAM w/ surface warfare capable 
seeker) 
 Max Organic Defensive Range = 80 nmi (SM-2) 
 Max Organic Sensor Range = 460 nmi (MH-60) 
 LOS Communication Range to horizon = 18 nmi (UHF) 
 BLOS Communication Range = 1000+ nmi (HF or SATCOM) 
 DDG Platform Model (estimated 2025): 
 Max OASuW Range = 200 nmi (SM-6) 
 Max Organic Defensive Range = 200 nmi (SM-6) 
 
b. LCS Platform Model (from Scenario 2) 
 Max OASuW Range = 120 nmi 
 Max Organic Defensive Range = 27 nmi (ESSM) 
 Max Organic Sensor Range = 460 nmi (MH-60) 
 LOS Communication Range to horizon = 14 nmi (UHF) 
 BLOS Communication Range = 1000+ nmi (HF or SATCOM) 
 
c. LCS Platform Model (estimated 2025) 
 Max OASuW Range = 200 nmi 
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d. LHA/LHD Platform Model 
 Max Offensive Strike Range = 1000+ nmi (with JSF) 
 Max Organic Defensive Range = 27 nmi (ESSM) 
 Max Organic Sensor Range = 1000+ nmi (JSF) 
 LOS Communication Range to horizon = 20 nmi (UHF) 
 BLOS Communication Range = 1000+ nmi (HF or SATCOM) 
 
7. Other Platform Model Considerations 
Aviation detachment for use as sensors organic to the AFP: 
 DDG 51 class (per hull): two MH-60R, one Fire Scout. 
 LCS (per hull): one MH-60, one Fire Scout. 
Tactical communications systems are not limited to current program of record 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 91
APPENDIX C. STATISTICAL TESTING 
The highlighted p-values in Table C-1 demonstrate that: 
 When examining C2 success percentage, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the performance of the distributed, decentralized and 
centralized configurations. 
 When examining non C2 success percentage, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the performance of the distributed, 
decentralized and centralized configurations. 
 When examining C2 delivery time, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the performance of the distributed, decentralized and 
centralized configurations. 
 When examining non C2 delivery time, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the performance of the distributed, decentralized and 
centralized configurations. 
 When examining time from request to engage, there is a statistically 
significant difference between the performance of the distributed, 
decentralized and centralized configurations. 
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Table C-1 Test Case 1 Two Sample T-Test 
 
 
Distributed Decentralized Distributed Centralized Decentralized Centralized
Mean 80.4% 78.9% 80.4% 68.2% 78.9% 68.2%
Variance 0.011% 0.005% 0.011% 0.018% 0.005% 0.018%








Distributed Decentralized Distributed Centralized Decentralized Centralized
Mean 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.1% 90.0% 90.1%
Variance 0.00015% 0.00015% 0.00015% 0.00023% 0.00015% 0.00023%
Observations 10 10 10 10 10 10







Distributed Decentralized Distributed Centralized Decentralized Centralized
Mean 130.9 130.0 130.9 130.2 130.0 130.2
Variance 1.19 0.823 1.19 0.993 0.823 0.993








Distributed Decentralized Distributed Centralized Decentralized Centralized
Mean 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
Variance 4.5254E-09 4.24285E-09 4.5254E-09 1.12603E-08 4.24285E‐09 1.12603E‐08








Distributed Decentralized Distributed Centralized Decentralized Centralized
Mean 1261.455 1275.226 1261.455 1289.229 1275.226 1289.229
Variance 57.247 119.307 57.247 97.309 119.307 97.309

















































































































The highlighted p-values in Table C-2 demonstrate that: 
 When examining C2 success percentage, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the performance of the different platforms 
as C2 forwarder. 
 When examining non C2 success percentage, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the performance of the different platforms 
as C2 forwarder. 
 When examining C2 delivery time, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the performance of the different platforms as C2 
forwarder. 
 When examining non C2 delivery time, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the performance of the different platforms as C2 
forwarder. 
 When examining time from request to engage, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the performance of the different platforms 
as C2 forwarder. 
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Table C-2 Test Case 2 Two Sample T-Test 
 
 
DDG 1 DDG 2 DDG 1 LCS 1 DDG 1 LCS 2 DDG 1 LCS 3
Mean 80.8% 80.5% 80.8% 80.3% 80.8% 80.4% 80.8% 80.2%
Variance 0.0125% 0.0187% 0.0125% 0.0090% 0.0125% 0.0114% 0.0125% 0.0027%








DDG 2 LCS 1 DDG 2 LCS 2 DDG 2 LCS 3
Mean 80.5% 80.3% 80.5% 80.4% 80.5% 80.2%
Variance 0.0187% 0.0090% 0.0187% 0.0114% 0.0187% 0.0027%








LCS 1 LCS 2 LCS 1 LCS 3
Mean 80.3% 80.4% 80.3% 80.2%
Variance 0.0090% 0.0114% 0.0090% 0.0027%



















DDG 1 DDG 2 DDG 1 LCS 1 DDG 1 LCS 2 DDG 1 LCS 3
Mean 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.0%
Variance 0.000067% 0.000090% 0.000067% 0.000080% 0.000067% 0.000147% 0.000067% 0.000049%








DDG 2 LCS 1 DDG 2 LCS 2 DDG 2 LCS 3
Mean 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.0%
Variance 0.000090% 0.000080% 0.000090% 0.000147% 0.000090% 0.000049%








LCS 1 LCS 2 LCS 1 LCS 3
Mean 90.0% 90.0% 90.0% 90.0%
Variance 0.000080% 0.000147% 0.000080% 0.000049%

































































































































































DDG 1 DDG 2 DDG 1 LCS 1 DDG 1 LCS 2 DDG 1 LCS 3
Mean 130.08 130.54 130.08 130.01 130.08 130.85 130.08 130.26
Variance 1.14 2.93 1.14 0.61 1.14 1.19 1.14 0.83








DDG 2 LCS 1 DDG 2 LCS 2 DDG 2 LCS 3
Mean 130.54 130.01 130.54 130.85 130.54 130.26
Variance 2.93 0.61 2.93 1.19 2.93 0.83








LCS 1 LCS 2 LCS 1 LCS 3
Mean 130.01 130.85 130.01 130.26
Variance 0.61 1.19 0.61 0.83



















DDG 1 DDG 2 DDG 1 LCS 1 DDG 1 LCS 2 DDG 1 LCS 3
Mean 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
Variance 3.9609E-09 3.41943E-09 3.9609E-09 2.81302E-09 3.9609E-09 4.5254E-09 3.9609E-09 4.49042E-09








DDG 2 LCS 1 DDG 2 LCS 2 DDG 2 LCS 3
Mean 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
Variance 3.41943E-09 2.81302E-09 3.41943E-09 4.5254E-09 3.41943E-09 4.49042E-09








LCS 1 LCS 2 LCS 1 LCS 3
Mean 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
Variance 2.81302E-09 4.5254E-09 2.81302E-09 4.49042E-09



































































































































































The highlighted p-values in Table C-3 demonstrate that: 
 When examining C2 success percentage, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the performance of the distributed, decentralized and 
centralized configurations in jamming environments. 
Table C-3 Test Case 3 Paired T-Test 
 
 
DDG 1 DDG 2 DDG 1 LCS 1 DDG 1 LCS 2 DDG 1 LCS 3
Mean 1259.9 1262.0 1259.9 1261.5 1259.9 1261.5 1259.9 1258.8
Variance 79.6 73.9 79.6 52.2 79.6 57.2 79.6 70.1








DDG 2 LCS 1 DDG 2 LCS 2 DDG 2 LCS 3
Mean 1262.0 1261.5 1262.0 1261.5 1262.0 1258.8
Variance 73.9 52.2 73.9 57.2 73.9 70.1








LCS 1 LCS 2 LCS 1 LCS 3
Mean 1261.5 1261.5 1261.5 1258.8
Variance 52.2 57.2 52.2 70.1


























































































Distributed C2 Success Centralized C2 Success Distributed C2 Success Decentralized C2 Success Centralized C2 Success Decentralized C2 Success
Mean 26.3% 21.4% 26.3% 24.7% 21.4% 24.7%
Variance 10.3% 8.5% 10.3% 10.1% 8.5% 10.1%



















The highlighted p-values in Table C-4 demonstrate that: 
 When examining C2 success percentage, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the performance of the command authority at HHQ 
and the local AFP. 
 When examining non C2 success percentage, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the performance of the command authority 
at HHQ and the local AFP. 
 When examining C2 delivery time, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the performance of the command authority at HHQ 
and the local AFP. 
 When examining non C2 delivery time, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the performance of the command authority at HHQ 
and the local AFP. 
 When examining time from request to engage, there is a statistically 
significant difference between the performance of the command authority 
at HHQ and the local AFP. 
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The highlighted p-values in Table C-5 demonstrate that: 
 When examining C2 success percentage, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the performance of the command authority at HHQ 
and the local AFP in jamming environments. 
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APPENDIX D. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
 Commander, Naval Surface Forces is the primary sponsor and, by 
operating the Distributed Lethality Task Force, is a major stakeholder. 
 U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Fleet Forces are the two U.S. Navy commands 
responsible for manning, training, and equipping maritime forces to 
operate forward in all warfare areas and doctrine, including distributed 
lethality. 
 The U.S. Navy Type Commanders are the senior domain commanders on 
each coast (Surface, Aviation, and Submarines) and will be charged with 
implementing the distributed lethality training. 
 The Navy Warfare Development Command is charged with development 
and innovation of solutions to complex maritime warfare problems. 
 The Combatant Commanders, Numbered Fleet Commanders, and Task 
Force Commanders will be executing operations within the distributed 
lethality framework. 
 The Navy System Commands cover technical development and 
maintenance of the complex systems that are used in today’s maritime 
domain. These commands will be tasked with development and integration 
of any new physical systems required to execute distributed lethality. 
 The U.S. Coast Guard operates with the U.S. Navy in Maritime Homeland 
Defense and Maritime Homeland Security missions, both at home and 
abroad. The distributed lethality concept will require integration with our 
sister maritime service. 
 Coalition and allied military forces. 
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